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l. TREATIES
1.1. The Conclusíon of Treaties 
1.1.1. Which organ(s) of the State has the power to conclude treaties 
(where necessary, give separate replies in respect of the different types 
of international agreements as distinguished by domestic law)? 
In Spanish Law, according to the interna! norms in force (arts. 63-2, 93-97 
and 149-1-3 of the Constitution of 27 December 1978; arts. 154-160 of the 
Regulations of Congress of 24 February 1982; arts. 144-147 of the Senate 
Regulations of 26 May 1982; article 10-5 of our Law on the Juridical System 
of the State Administration of 26 July 1957; arts. 4, 5, 13, 16 and 23 of the 
Decree 801/1972, of 24 March on the activity of the Administration in the 
field of international treaties), the substantive competence to conclude in­
ternational treaties, that is to say, to decide upon the binding of the State 
of Spain by means of such treaties, really belongs to the Govemment of the 
Nation (Council of Ministers), though the formal faculty of conclusion -
by signature, interchange of documents, ratification or adherence -may 
be attributed to the Head of State, the President of the Government, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs or even any other representative of the Sta te of 
Spain with full powers to do so (arts. 4, 6 and 7 of Decree 801/1972). 
The necessary participation of Parliament (Congress and Senate) 
through a prior authorization to conclude certain international treaties 
(arts. 93 and 94-1 of the SC)-a question that we shall consider in 1.1.2.­
constitutes a constitutional requirement of validity for the conclusion of 
the treaty. But Parliamentary participation binds only in one way: the 
denial of authorization prevents the treaty from being concluded; on the 
other hand, granting the authorization does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion of it. In last instance, it is always the Govemment, that decides 
on the conclusion of a treaty, as well as the appropriate moment to do it 
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(though Parliament may remove its prior authorization if the treaty is not 
concluded after a reasonable period of time). 
At this point we can state that Parliament's authorization, in cases set 
by the Constitution, constitutes a prior requirement for the conclusion of 
international treaties, though it is clear that in no way we can properly 
speak of a Parliament's genuine faculty to conclude international treaties. 
Finally, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, we cannot forget 
that when art. 63-2 SC says that: 
"It is incumbent on the King to express the consent of the Sta te to obliga te 
itself internationally through treaties in conformity with the Constitution 
and the laws" 
it is speaking of a formal faculty - which as we have already seen may 
also be vested in the President of the Government, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and any other representative of the State with full powers to do so 
- and not of a substantive faculty that may only be vested in the Govern­
ment with Parliament's participation in cases established by the Constitu­
tion. Our Constitution allows the participation of other members than the
Head of Sta te in the conclusion of a treaty (see art. 4, 6 and 7 of the Decree
801/1972). Although it is a preconstitutional norm, practice since the Con­
stitution shows that it is still in force as far as this point is concerned. It
would be hardly realistic to say that all the State declarations at the inter­
national level must be made by the King. But going back to practice based
on the Constitution, it is evident that: a) in those international treaties
where the State's agreement is expressed by means of ratification or ad­
herence after Parliament's authorization, it is always the King who signs
the documents; b) in those treaties where the State's agreement is ex­
pressed by means of ratification or adherence but without Parliament's
authorization, it is also the King who participates because of the way of
conclusion; c) in international treaties with a simplified way of conclusion
that also require Parliament's authorization the King does not participate
because of the way of conclusion; and d) in international treaties with a
simplified way of conclusion that do not require Parliament's authoriza­
tion, the King does not participate either.
In short, practice based on the Constitution shows that the King's 
participation only takes place when international treaties are solemnly 
concluded. A recent judgment by our Constitutional Court (11 April 1991) 
has held this practice consistent to the Constitution, when asked if a 
Spanish-German interchange of documents enlarging the bilateral agree­
ment of extradition to financia! offences was part of our domestic law in 
spite of the absence of the King's signature. This Court said in firm terms 
that: 
"neither does art. 63.2 require that it should be always the King who 
must conclude international treaties; nor does art. 94.1 compel the King 
to participate when Parliament authorizes the conclusion of an interna­
tional treaty". 
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To conclude, the King's faculties relate basically to those set in art. 91 
se and his ratification, when occurring, answers to a controlled compe­
tence, having to be countersigned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (arts. 
56-3 and 64 SC).
1.1.2. Does this organ (or organs) have full or limited treaty making
powers?
The substantive competence of the State to conclude intemational treaties 
is limited in two ways. 
On one hand, art. 95-1 se says that: 
"The conclusion of an international treaty which contains stipulations 
contrary to the Constitution shall require a prior constitutional revision". 
The first limitation would thus be the prohibition on concluding 
international treaties in conflict with the eonstitution. Such a conflict 
must be stated by the eonstitutional eourt at the request of the Govern­
ment or either one of the Chambers of the Parliament (eongress-Senate). 
In this sense, art. 95-2 se says that : 
"The Government or either of the Chambers may request the Constitutio­
nal Court to declare whether or not such a contradiction exists". 
This article has been developed by norms of lower standing which 
specify that the petition has to be made by eongress, at the request of two 
Groups of Parliament or one-fifth of its members (art. 157-1 RC) or by the 
Senate, at the request of one Group of Parliament or 25 senators (art. 147 
RS). This demand to the Constitutional eourt at once stops proceedings 
under the prior authorization. These proceedings will begin again only 
when this Court has stated the conformity of the stipulations of that 
international treaty with the eonstitution (art. 157-2 Re and 147 RS). If 
the eonstitutional Court states the existence of a conflict between the 
stipulations of an international treaty and the eonstitution, that treaty 
cannot be concluded without the prior revision of the eonstitution (arts. 
95-1 se and 157-3 RC); this revision will have to be made according to
Title X of the eonstitution (arts. 166-169 SC). Toe possible demand to the
eonstitutional eourt must be made before the conclusion of the treaty,
since the eonstitutional eourt has to decide:
" ... on the existence or non-existence of a contradiction between the Cons­
titution and the stipulations of an international treaty whose text is 
already fixed, but has not yet been ratified" (art. 78-1 CCOL). 
A double aim is pursued with this limitation, as the eonstitutional 
eourt has stated in a Declaration of 1 July 1992: 
"Through art. 95-2, the Constitution attributes to the Constitutional Court 
a double task: to preserve the Constitution and to guarantee the security 
and stability of the international engagements arranged by Spain. In its 
task of interpretation, this Court has to decide upon a possible contradic­
tion between the Constitution and an international treaty whose text, 
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though already fixed, has not yet been concluded (art. 78-1 CCOL). If the 
contradiction is stated, such a treaty cannot be ratified without a prior 
revision of the Constitution (art. 95-1 SC). In this way, the Constitution, 
by means of the proceeding set in Title X, retains its primacy, at the same 
time as the treaty analyzed achieves full legal stability because of the bin­
ding judgment of the Court (art. 78-2 CCOL)". 
Altough the above-mentioned primacy may also be ensured by the trea­
ties' impugnment (arts. 27-2-c, 31 and 32-1 CCOL) or lack of conformity 
with the Constitution question (art. 35 CCOL) it is evident that such a 
solution causes obvious disorder to the State's international relations. 
And it is this disorder that our Constitution tries to avoid. This double 
aim must therefore be taken into account when interpreting both art. 95 
SC and 78 CCOL in order to determine the object of our decision, its 
scope and the role played in its adoption by both this Tribunal and the 
legitimate organs to request it and be heard in the requests demanded by 
others". 
On this first limitation, see also, infra, 1.1.5. 
The second limitation consists in the necessity to get Parliament's 
authorization in arder to conclude certain treaties. This authorization 
may adopt two different forms : on one hand, Parliament must authorize 
through an organic law (art. 93 SC) the ratification of treaties that 
attribute to intemational organisations or institutions the exercise of com­
petences established by the Constitution. The approval of such a law 
requires an absolute majority of Congress in a final vote on the whole bill 
( art. 81-2 SC). A recent judgment of our Constitutional Court (Judgment 
28/1991, of 14 February) described art. 93 SC as a "constitutional norm of 
an organic-procedural character", adding that this article: 
"has severa! contents: a) the conclusion of certain kinds of international 
treaties may only be authorized through an Organic Law; b) such treaties 
'are those ones by which competences established by Constitution are 
attributed to international organisations or institutions'; and c) 'the per­
formance of those treaties as well as that of the decisions coming from 
international organisations' will be guaranteed by either the Parliament 
or the Government, according to the circumstances. 
In accordance with this article, the Organic Law 10/1985, of 2 August, 
authorized the ratification of the Adherence Treaty of Spain to the Euro­
pean Communities, signed the previous 12th of June that would come 
into force onJanuary lst, 1986". 
Moreover, in a Declaration of 1 July 1992, our Constitutional Court 
related to art. 93 SC in the following terms: 
"article 93 allows the attribution of the 'exercise of competences derived 
from the Constitution', which implies a limit to the competences of Spa­
nish public powers (limit to the 'sovereign rights', in terms of the Euro­
pean Communities Court of Justice, Costa/Ene/, Judgment of 15 July 
1964). To make this limit work, a real transfer of the exercise of competen­
ces to international organisations or institutions is necessary ... ". 
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According to the eonstitutional Court, the extraordinary system of 
prior authorization set by art. 93 se stands only for international treaties 
by which the exercise of competences established by the Constitution is 
transferred to international organisations; the Spanish State therefore 
remains the holder of such competences. From a constitutional point of 
view, such a transfer is not definite, as the eourt of Justice of the Euro­
pean Communities has already said; the transfer of the exercise - and 
not the property of those competences leaves open the possibility of 
bringing thern back through a simple renundation of the treaties. 
Second, art. 93 <loes not finish its task with the authorization of Span­
ish adherence to the European Communities. It is true that this was the 
only aim pursued with the insertion of this article in the Constitution, but 
nowadays we can keep in mind other considerations. Article 93 would be 
the way to transfer the exercise of competences established by the Consti­
tution not only to the European Communities, but also to any other inter­
national organisations. Though it has not occured yet, this possibility was 
defended by important political parties, such as the Spanish Socialist 
Workers' Party - at that time an opposition party and now in power -
regarding our adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty, that did finally take 
place under art. 94-1 instead of art. 93 SC. 
For the same reasons, we can not think that art. 93 se achieved its 
pursued aim with Organic Law 10/1985, of 2 August, authorizing the rat­
ification of the Adherence Treaty of Spain to the European Communities. 
T hat Organic Law was not intended to obviate Parliament's authoriza­
tion of art. 93 when ratifying treaties of arnendment or modification of 
the European eommunities' constitutive treaties. In the case of the Euro­
pean Single Act, which also followed art. 93 se and whose parliamentary 
authorization was granted by Organic Law 4/1986, of 26 November, 
which authorized the ratification of the European Single Act, signed in 
Luxemburg on 17 February 1986, it was explained that: 
" ... modification of certain stipulations of the constitutive Treaties of the 
European Communities, ratification of and adherence to which were 
authorized by Organic Law 10/1985, of 2 August, according to art. 93 SC, 
requires a new declaration authorized by the same procedure". 
Our Constitutional Court has also stated, in its Declaratíon of 1 July 
1992, that art. 93 should be followed by Parliament when authorizing the 
ratification of the European Treaty of Union, made in Maastricht on 7 
February 1992. 
Nevertheless, the Spanish Govemment is not limited by art. 93 se in 
concluding international treaties which imply a modification or an 
amendment of "primary or original" Ee law, but only by those that imply 
a transfer of the exercise of competences established by the Spanish eon­
stitution. Not in the other way. For example, the conclusion of the Joining 
Treaty of certain organs belonging to the three eommunities, if occurred 
today, would not require the procedure of art. 93 SC, but that of art. 94-1 
se, since it would not mean a transfer of the exercise of competences 
established by the eonstitution; this is the case, for example, of the Euro-
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pean Electoral Act, ratification of which was authorized under the proce­
dure of art. 94-1 and not of art. 93 SC. 
As we have already seen, there is a second kind of prior authoriz­
ation by Parliament. According to art. 94-1 SC Parliament's prior authori­
zation is also necessary to conclude treatíes of a political or military char­
acter, treaties related to the territorial integrity of  the State or  
fundamental rights and obligations, treaties that will involve financia! 
obligations for the Public Finance or will imply modification or abolition 
of a law or will require legislative measures for their performance (art. 94-
1 SC). In this kind of treaties, Parliament's authorization must be 
obtained through a majority of votes in both Chambers: Congress and 
Senate (art. 74-2 SC). The other international treaties, that is to say, the 
ones that remain outside arts. 93 and 94-1 se do not need Parliament's 
prior authorization for. their conclusion. Government's report to Parlia­
ment immediately after conclusion is enough (art. 94-2 SC). 
1.1.3. Do the entities making up the State have treaty making pow­
ers or are they associated with the conclusion of treaties? 
As seen in 1.1.1. the substantive competence to conclude treaties is vested 
in the Government. 
Nevertheless, we could say that whenever Parliament's prior auth­
orization is needed, such a competence is shared with both ehambers. 
From this point of view, Parliament's authorization, when required 
by eonstitution (art. 93 and 94-1 SC) would be a constituent element of 
the State's agreement; that shared substantive competence does not 
imply Parliament's transformation into an organ of the State with treaty­
making powers. Though it is true that denial of authorization blocks the 
possibility of conclusion, Parliament's grant of authorization <loes not 
imply the conclusion of the treaty; it is therefore the Government that 
decides this point in the last instance. 
On the other hand, considering the complex configuration of the 
Spanish State, made up of Autonomous eommunities (arts. 2 and 143-
158 SC) - totalling 17 and waiting for the definite territorial organisation 
of eeuta and Melilla, as well as of Gibraltar we can wonder about the 
role that such eommunities and their organs (Legislative Assemblies and 
autonomous Governments) play in the treaty-making process. 
According to art. 149-1-3ª se, the State {through its central organs) 
has sole competence in the field of international relations. Autonomous 
eommunities, lack therefore the ius contrahendi, that is to say, the right to 
conclude international treaties. We should remember, in this sense, the 
eonstitutional Court Judgment 137 /1989, of 20 July, nullifying the "Col­
laboration Agreement" between the Autonomous Community of Galicia 
and the Danish Government. In this judgment, the Constitutional Court 
stated that: 
" ... we must start by saying that all competence over international rela­
tions belongs only to the central organs of the State. This exclusive cha-
Spain 
racter has already been declared by this eourt in Decisions 44/1982 and 
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... The question here discussed is whether art. 149-1-3 se prevents the 
Autonomous eommunities from having any form of ius contrahendi. If it 
were so, any eonvention or Agreement made by these entities with an 
international organisation or a foreign State would not be in accordance 
with the eonstitution, no matter what competence that entity could have 
in that specific field. 
In the field of Constitutione ferenda this constitutional point of view has 
been criticized, since it does not take into account the diversity of interna­
tional relations nowadays; anyway, it is clear, in the field of Constitutione 
lata that the State is the exclusive holder of competence to conclude inter­
national Treaties or eonventions. No exception to this principle is brou­
ght up by our eonstitution. 
The conclusion that treaty-making power belongs only to the State is not 
only shown by art. 149-1-3 se, but also by other articles of the se, as well 
as its background and the interpretation made by the legislator of the 
Autonomous Statutes regarding this point". 
The only exceptions that our Constitutional Court recognize to the 
exclusive ius contrahendi of the central organs of the State come from their 
own will and not from the Autonomous Communities. This is the case of 
the Organic Laws that delegate to the Autonomous Communities compe­
tences whose holder is the State (art. 150-2 SC) and that could be applied 
to "international relations" in certain cases. Nevertheless, this route has 
not been followed yet. Every time the Spanish State has concluded inter­
national treaties that impacted to the territory of a certain Autonomous 
Community, it has been the central organs of the State - and not those of 
the Autonomous Community affected - that have concluded the treaty, 
as occurred with the Treaty concluded between Spain and the Intergov­
ernmental Office on Information, for the development of Technology in 
the Valencian Autonomous Community, on 31 October 1984. 
The second exception that the Constitutional Court points out to the 
exclusive ius contrahendi of the central organs of the State is wrongly 
attributed to Comparative Law and not to International Law. It seems the 
Constitutional Court is indirectly alluding to the European Convention 
on interborder cooperation between authorities and territorial groupings, 
adopted in the Council of Europe on 21 May 1980. Though it is true that 
the State of Spain ratified this Convention in 1990, it made its real appli­
cation depend upon the prior conclusion of intergovernmental agree­
ments with the other interested party. Such a conclusion has not arrived 
yet, which has prevented other kinds of interlocal agreements set in the 
above mentioned Convention from being concluded. On the other hand, 
on 5 November 1983, the Spanish Autonomous Communities next to the 
Pyrenees, the French regions and Andorra created the Working Commu­
nity of the Pyrenees. This association was not created, in fact, by an inter­
national treaty, and does not have ius ad tractatum. It aims to increase 
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regional interborder cooperation by means of political and not juridical 
methods (conclusion of intemational treaties). 
As the Constitutional Court stresses in the above mentioned judg­
ment, a different question from the Autonomous Communities' ius cont­
rahendi is their participation "in the internal proceedings of elaboration 
and execution of international treaties". In this sense, it is possible to 
speak of a sort of participation, though limited, by the Autonomous Com­
munities in the negotiation's proceedings of international norms. 
Our Constitution does not say anything regarding this point, and 
there does not exist a lower norm regulating completely the different 
kinds of participation by Autonomous Communities in the external 
action of the Sta te of Spain. This blank is being covered through the fre­
quent allusions by our Constitutional Court to the obligation of coopera­
tion between the central organs of the State and the Autonomous 
Communities relating to international nomogenetic proceedings. In Judg­
ment 18/1982, of 4 May, this Court declared that this obligation of coop­
eration "does not need a concrete justification" since "it is implied in the 
territorial organisation established by the Constitution". In Judgment 
252/1988, of 20 December, the same Court said that: 
"The need for cooperation between the Central and the Autonomous 
Administrations arises from both the systematic interpretation of the 
Constitution and its primacy over the Statutes of Autonomy; this coope­
ration may in many cases require - especially relating our inclusion in 
the European Economic Community - ways of articulation that only an 
inadequate interpretation of the constitutional and statutary norms may 
hinder". 
Examples of this generic obligation to cooperation have arisen from 
the different Statutes of Autonomy of the Autonomous Communities. 
Almost all of them (with the exception of the Valencian Community and 
La Rioja) do admit their participation in the negotiation of treaties (which 
is the competence of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and must be authorized 
by the Council of Ministers: art. 9-1 and 2 of the Decree 801/1972). 
Autonomous Communities' participation in the negotiation of interna­
tional treaties differs from one Statute to another, yielding the following 
classification: 
a) Statutes that admit the right to ask the Government for the negoti­
ation of a certain kind of international treaties and the right to
receive information on those treaties that relate to matters of "spe­
cific interests" for the Autonomous Community (Andalusia, Ara­
gon, Asturias, Catalonia and Toe Basque Country);
b) Statutes that only admit the right to ask for negotiation (Toe Bale­
aric Islands, Cantabria, Castile-Leon, Castile-La Mancha, Estrema­
dura and Galicia);
c) Statutes that only admit the right to information (Toe Canary
Islands, Madrid, Murcia and Navarre);
d)Statutes that remain silent on this point (Comunidad Valenciana
and La Rioja).
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In short, Autonomous Communities do not have treaty-making pow­
ers but they do play a larger or smaller role in the negotiation process, 
either asking the Government to begin it or receiving information on its 
development. 
The right to ask for the negotiation of treaties compels the Govern­
ment to start such negotiations or, if not performed, to justify its denial or 
impossibility. Notwithstanding, the recognition of this right has a limited 
scope, since it does not relate to all international treaties. It is limited to 
treaties whose aim is the establishment of cultural relations with other 
States where social groups of the same origin live (Statute of Toe Basque 
Country, Catalonia, Galicia and Andalusia); to treaties that aim at collabo­
ration by people of the Autonomous Community who live abroad in the 
social and cultural life of their place of birth (Sta tutes of Galicia, Asturias, 
Cantabria and Toe Balearic Islands); to treaties that aim at special assist­
ance of the emigrants from that Autonomous Community (Sta tutes of 
Andalusia and Castile-La Mancha); and finally to all treaties related to 
"matters of interest for Aragon" and especially to those "regarding its 
geographical location as a border region" (Statute of Aragon). 
On the other hand, the regulation on the right to receive information 
amounts to very little. In eight out of nine Autonomous Communities 
that do have this right recognized in their Statutes of'Autonomy, it is lim­
ited to the elaboration of international treaties "that relate to matters of 
their specific interests"; this right is even more limited for Murcia, where 
it is restricted to "treaties that relate to matters of its competence". 
No legal norm in our domestic law establishes when the Government 
has to inform the Autonomous Communities: whether it is while the 
treaty is being negotiated or when the text is already authenticated but 
not yet ratified. In this sense, we must say that the right to information 
compels the Government to notify the negotiation or adoption of an 
international treaty to the Autonomous Community affected, but it does 
not include the right of that Community to reply to that information or 
the binding of the Government to that answer. When the Constitution 
and the Statutes of Autonomy were written, amendments asking for a 
right to be heard were refused, leaving only the already known right to 
information. The only exception to this rule was the Canary Islands Stat­
ute of Autonomy, where it is said: 
"Once the information is received, the Government of the Autonomous 
Community will give an answer, if needed" (art. 37-1). 
Even in this way, such an opinion will not have a binding character. 
Finally, the Autonomous Community Statutes do not speak about the 
direct participation of their representatives in negotiating the treaty. Nev­
ertheless, there is no problem in this as far as the Government considers it 
appropriate to the circumstances. 
This possibility was contemplated in the Draft Autonomous Statute 
of Galicia and The Canary Islands, but it was ruled out in Parliament. 
Anyway, it may still occur by means of ad hoc decisions of the Govern­
ment in this sense or by a modification of Decree 801/1972, 24 March, on 
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the activity of the Administration in the field of international treaties in 
order to achieve a real right of co-negotiation. 
Many of the doubts caused by the lack of regulations have been over­
come by practice. Negotiations of the Adherence Treaty of Spain to the 
European Communities stand as a clear example. Although no represent­
ative of the Autonomous Communities participated in the negotiation of 
the treaty, the Government, through the Secretary of State for relations 
with the European Communities, reported not only to those Autonomous 
Communities whose Statutes demanded it, but to all of them. Between 
January 1983 and 1 October 1985, it had 273 reporting meetings with the 
different autonomous governments: 17 with Andalusia; 14 with Aragon; 
16 with Asturias; 13 with the Balearic Islands; 10 with the Canary Islands; 
16 with Cantabria; 19 with Castile-La Mancha; 13 with Castile-Leon; 21 
with Catalonia; 12 with Estremadura; 23 with Galicia; 12 with La Rioja; 18 
with Madrid; 16 with Murcia; 18 with Navarre; 20 with Valencia; and 15 
with The Basque Country. These figures show that not even those Auton­
omous Communities with an explidt right to information had more 
meetings with the above mentioned Secretary, and that absolutely all of 
them had a chance not only to receive information, but also to give their 
opinion; these meetings took place during the negotiation, at a time the 
Government could include their opinions with those of the national dele­
gation; their frequency in1plied that Autonomous Communities could 
follow and control the negotiation; and finally, that their participation 
became a necessary step, though not binding. In this sense, we may con­
sider the Report of the Canary Islands Parliament to Congress of 22 June 
1985, against the Draft Organic Law authorizing the adherence of Spain 
to the European Communities. 
1.1.4. Are there any organs exercising a consultative role in the 
domestic procedure for making treaties? 
Art. 107 SC says that "the Council of State is the highest consultative body 
of the Government". It is reasonable then for the Government to ask for its 
ad vice when conduding intemational treaties. 
Nevertheless two questions arise from this legal opinion: a) its com­
pulsory character and. b) its value. 
According to art. 22-1 of the Organic Law on the Council of State of 
22 April 1980, consultation of the Permanent Commission of the Council 
of State by the Government "on the necessity of Parliament's authoriza­
tion" is compulsory for all treaties, which means a prior classification of 
international treaties. If it states the need for Parliament's authorization 
for the conclusion of the treaty, it is significant, though not definite that 
such treaty will belong to those included in art. 93 or 94-1 SC. This norm 
has been extensively criticized because the obligation to ask the Perma­
nent Commission of the Council of State in all kinds of treaties whether 
or not prior Parliamentary authorization is required creates an adminis­
trative step that often unnecessarily delays the interna! procedure for 
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concluding a treaty. It has thus been suggested that the Permanent eom­
mission of the eouncil of State need not be asked at any time when the 
Government is sure of the need for Parliamentary authorization. On the 
other hand, it has also been criticized that the above mentioned article 
only states the necessity for the Permanent eommission of the eouncil of 
State to declare whether or not a certain treaty requires Parliament's prior 
authorization, without saying, if so, what kind of prior authorization is 
required. The eommission should have said if Parliamentary authoriza­
tion must be granted by means of an organic law (treaties of art. 93 SC) or 
by the voting proceeding of art. 74-2 se (treaties of art. 94-1 SC). 
In short, the Government's consultation of the Permanent eommis­
sion of the eouncil of State is compulsory for all kinds of treaties in order 
to determine the necessity of a Parliamentary authorization for their con­
clusion. But the Government, according to the law, will be free to follow 
such advice or not; it is therefore compulsory but not binding; the Gov­
ernment may keep a treaty outside the scope of Parliamentary authoriza­
tion against the opinion of the Permanent eommission of the eouncil of 
State. But this is unusual. This ad vice does not bind Parliament either, 
which implies that even though the Government follows it, Parliament 
may not agree afterwards. It is even possible for the Permanent eommis­
sion of the eouncil of State to state that a certain treaty does not require 
Parliament's authorization (art. 94-2), for the Government to reclassify it 
as one of those that require it (art. 93 or 94-1 SC) and for Parliament, 
though in accordance with the Government's opinion, to decide on a dif­
ferent kind of prior authorization. This potential case is, however, 
unlikely to happen in practice. 
1.1.5. Is there any procedure, prior to ratification of a treaty, to 
ensure its conformittJ with the constitution? 
Until recently, there have been two procedures, prior to ratification of a 
treaty, to ensure its conformity with the eonstitution. 
The first one, which relates to all sort of treaties - arts. 93, 94-1 and 
94-2 se -, is found in art. 95-1 se, which says:
"The conclusion of an international treaty which contains stipulations
contrary to the Constitution shall require a prior constitutional revision".
If there are doubts on the conformity of a certain treaty with the eon-
stitution, art. 95-2 says that: 
"The Government or either of the Chambers may request the Constitutio­
nal Court to declare whether or not such a contradiction exists". 
It is therefore the eonstitutional eourt which, at the request of the 
Government or Parliament, in the last instance checks the conformity of a 
treaty with the eonstitution before its ratification. 
After the request regulated by art. 95-2 se the eonstitutional eourt 
"will make a binding statement according to art. 95 Se" (art. 78-2 eeOL). 
This recourse to art. 95 se has been demanded only once in our fifteen 
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years of dem.ocratic life. Taking advantage of this opportunity, our Con­
stitutional Court described the legal nature of the request in the followins 
m.anner:
" ... the object of the request is a declaration, a judgment and not a legal
opinion; the request reveals a reasonable doubt, and we are not asked for 
an opinion to solve it, but for a binding judgment. 
For this reason, and even when the judgment does not have a litigious 
nature, the Constitutional Court's position as the highest interpretative 
authority of Constitution is not affected by this circumstance. Here, the 
Constitutional Court acts as the jurisdictional organ it is, and its declara­
tion has to be based therefore on legal reasonings. It will examine the 
extent of agreement between the Constitution and the stipulations of the 
treaty submitted to a prior control, since art. 95-1 SC has only attributed 
to Govemment and b.oth Chambers of Parliament the faculty to request 
of the Constitutional Court a judgment whenever doubts arise on the 
conformity of a certain treaty's stipulations with the Constitution. The 
initiative does not belong to the Court ex officio. Nevertheless, this Court 
may demand information according to art. 78-3 CCOL. 
But, in any case, whether this Court states the conventional norm con­
forms with the Constitution or not, in either case the resolution adopted 
will have force of law. Although that resolution cannot be properly called 
a "judgment" (art. 86-2 CCOL), it is a jurisdictional decision of a binding 
character (art. 78-2, id.) and it has therefore erga omnes effects (art. 164-1 in 
fine CE); whether it be negative or exclusive, which would prevent the sti­
pulation from being transferred to this Court through the declaration of 
non-conformity with the Constitution proceedings, or whether it be posi­
tive, which would compel the public powers to respect and follow our 
declaration; for example, if its content was that a certain stipulation is 
contrary to Constitution, the executive immediate and direct effect 
should be the revision of the Constitution before the treaty's approval" 
(Declaration of 1 July 1992). 
T he origin of this judgment was the Governm.ent's consent of 24 
April 1992, to request from the Constitutional Court a statem.ent on the 
existence or nonexistence of a conflict between article 8B, lst paragraph 
of the EEC Constitutive Treaty in the new wording of article G (C), of the 
European Treaty of Union made in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 and art. 
13-2 SC that adm.its "the right of foreigners to vote in local elections" in
the term.s established by treaty or law. Our Constitutional Court clearly
said that the conventional stipulation:
"is not in conformity with art. 13-2 of the Constitution regarding the attri­
bution of a passive suffrage right in local elections to the citizens of the 
European Union that were not Spanish nationals". 
Leaving aside the Government's proposals to resolve such a contra­
diction, the Court stated that the procedure to be followed in this case to 
revise the Constitution is the ordinary one, established in art. 167 SC. The 
first partial reform. of the Constitution of 1978 was m.ade by virtue of this 
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article to add "and passive" in the expression "right to active suffrage in 
municipal elections" of art. 13-2 SC. 
The second procedure prior to ratification of a treaty to ensure its 
conformity with the constitution was to question before the eonsti­
tutional eourt the organic law that authorizes - according to art. 93 se 
- the conclusion of a treaty which attributes to international organisa­
tions or institutions the exercise of constitutional competences by means
of a request for a statement of lack of conformity with the eonstitution
(art. 79 of eeOL of 3 October 1979). This procedure was only related to
those treaties included in art. 93 se where Parliament's prior authoriza­
tion must be adopted by means of an organic law and relates neither to
treaties included in art. 94-1 - where Parliament's authorization is
adopted by the majority vote of both ehambers - nor to those included
in art. 94-2 which do not require a prior authorization of Parliament. In
this procedure the active right to request a statement of lack of conform­
ity with the eonstitution was broader than in the case of art. 95 se, since
it rested with the President of Government, the People's Defensor
(Ombudsman), 50 members of eongress, 50 senators, the executive
organs of the Autonomous Communities and, in certain cases, their
Assemblies (art. 162 SC and art. 79-2 CCOL). Nevertheless, no statement
of lack of conformity with the eonstitution has been requested before
1985 and, afterwards, this procedure was no more available as art. 79
CCOL was abrogated by the Organic Law 4/1985, of 7 June 1985.
1.1.6. Are the rules relating to the treaty making power varied in 
practice? 
The substantive competence to conclude international treaties rests with 
the Spanish Government. 
But practice shows that the formal act of conclusion may be attrib­
uted to the Head of State (art. 63-2 se: "It is incumbent on the King to 
express the consent of the State to oblígate itself internationally through 
treaties ... "), to the President of the Government, to the Foreign Affairs 
Minister or to any other representative of the State with full powers to do 
so. 
As we already saw in 1.1.1. post-constitutional practice in this subject 
shows that: a) in those international treaties where the State's agreement 
is expressed by means of ratification or adherence subject to Parliament's 
authorization, it is always the King who participa tes; b) in those treaties 
where the State's agreement is expressed by means of ratification or 
adherence but without Parliament's authorization, it is álso the King who 
participates with regard to the procedure of conclusion; e) in interna­
tional treaties with a simplified procedure of-conclusion that also need 
Parliament's authorization, the King <loes not participate; and d) in inter­
national treaties with a simplified way of conclusion that do not need 
Parliament's authoritation, the King <loes not participate either. 
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Another example where practice is modifying our domestic law 
regarding the conclusion of intemational treaties is the way how treaties 
are being concluded. According to Decree 801/1972, of 24 March, on the 
activity of the Administration in the field of intemational treaties, the 
conclusion of a treaty may only be made by means of signature, ratifica­
tion, or adherence to the treaty, whenever the treaty states so or it is said 
by any other means (arts. 15, 16 and 22 respectively). On the other hand, 
Spain adhered to the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969, on the Law of 
Treaties, and thus it is obvious that all the ways of conclusion set out in 
art. 11 (signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratifica­
tion, approval, adherence or any other ways agreed) are possible in our 
domestic law. Our highest Court has explicitly stated so¡ on 11 April 1991, 
it said that: 
"The central authorities are not limited only ... to the ways of conclusion 
regulated in the Decree on the activity of the Administration of 1972. 
They may also act through the more flexible ways authorized by the 
Vienna Convention, part of our domestic law, on the law of treaties ... ". 
In this sense, we may mention that in recent Spanish conventional 
practice a new way has appeared not explicitly included either in the 
Vienna Convention or in the Decree of 1972. It consists in the communica­
tion to the other Negotiating Parties of the completion of the necessary 
proceedings of our domestic law for the conclusion of an international 
treaty. T his new way takes place when the treaty's entry into force 
depends on the notification of the Negotiating Parties' fulfilled proceed­
ings. 
1.1.7. Does the organ(s) with treaty makíng powers have the power 
to conclude secret treatíes? 
Toe Spanish Constitution totally prevents the conclusion of secret treaties. 
First, because those treaties included in arts. 93 and 94-1 SC need Par­
liament's prior authorization for their conclusion, and such an authoriza­
tion could be adopted, at most, in a confidential way and according to the 
Chambers' Regulations. 
Second, because Govemment must report to Parliament the conclu­
sion of the other treaties (art. 94-2 SC) and the report includes, as Parlia­
ment's Regulations determine, the treaty's contents, which allows a check 
on conformity with the constitution (art. 159 Regulations of Congress). 
Third, because the treaty's official publication is a requirement for its 
application (art. 96-1 SC and 1-5 Civil Code). 
And fourth, because in our domestic law, the Decree 801/1972 estab­
lished two ways to ensure the necessary publicity for international trea­
ties concluded by Spain. First of all, art. 28 ordered as an obligation of the 
State the registration of every international treaty concluded by Spain in 
the UNO Secretariat: 
"The Foreign Affairs Ministry will adopt the necessary measures to 
ensure the fulfilment of art. 102 of the United Nations Charter regarding 
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registration in the Organisation's Secretariat of those treaties concluded 
by Spain". 
And in second place, art. 34 regulates an internal census of interna-
tional treaties when it says that: 
"Regardless of its publication in the OBS, in order to encourage among all 
the Administrative organs as well as people in general, knowledge of 
intemational obligations contracted by Spain, the Foreign Affairs Minis­
try will adopt the necessary measures to make possible: a) the periodic 
publication of collections of treaties ratified by Spain. b) the periodic 
publication of a list of treaties in force and binding for Spain. e) the esta­
blishment of databases regarding treaties". 
The prohibition of secret treaties is therefore irnplied in the Constitu­
tion, though it does not contain a specific disposition similar to art. 76 of 
the Republican Constitution of 9 December 1931, which said: 
"Secret Treaties and Conventions and secret stipulations of any treaty 
will not bind the Nation". 
1.1.8. What sanction exists far failure to observe domestic rules 
relating to the treaty making power? 
Two points of view should be considered. 
From an international point of view, art. 46-1 of the Vienna Conven­
tion - which Spain adhered to on 16 May 1972 - states that "[a] State 
may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been 
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding compe­
tence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation 
was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental 
importance". Therefore, any clear violation of an important domes tic 
norm relative to the competence to conclude treaties will result in the nul­
lification of such a treaty. 
Not all violations of internal law concerning the competence to con­
clude treaties may affect the validity of the State's consent. To have an 
effect on it, such an infringement must be first of all clear, evident; and 
then it must be related to fundamental norms. 
From a national point of view we can query where we are to find 
such fundamental norms of internal law relating to the competence to 
conclude treaties whose evident violation entails the treaty's nullification. 
As we already saw in 1.1.1. such norms are mainly located in the 
Spanish Constitution and in Royal Decree 801/1972. 
In short, from a domestic point of view we have to answer the fol­
lowing question: what is the sanction for failure to observe constitutional 
dispositions relating to the treaty-making power? or, in other words, 
what is the sanction for a treaty's ratification without Parliament's prior 
and necessary authorization requested by arts. 93 and 94-1 SC or without 
Parliament's immediate report after conclusion in cases set by art. 94-2? 
The answer to these questions leads us to speak of these treaties as 
lacking a formal conformity with the Constitution. This would be the 
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case of a treaty which, being among those regulated by art. 94-1 se, was 
qualified by the Government afterwards as one of those included in art. 
94-2, leaving it thus outside Parliament's authorization; or the case of a
treaty implying a transfer of competences established by eonstitution to
an international organisation which would follow the procedure set in
art. 94-1 or 94-2 se instead of the one set in art. 93 Se; or finally the case
of those treaties regulated neither in art. 93 nor in art. 94-1 se which the
Government did not report to eongress and Senate, according to art. 94-2
se, right after conclusion. At this point we have to take into account that
though there is no disposition explaining what we have to understand by
"immediately", it is obvious that such information will have to be passed
on befare the publication of the treaty's text in the OBS ..
But going back to the initial question, the consequence - in our 
domestic law - of the violation of the constitutional requirements for the 
treaties' conclusion is - taking into account that there is no specific legal 
sanction - the declaration of a lack of conformity with the constitution. 
Art.27-2-c) eeOL includes international treaties among the texts that 
admit this declaration. The declaration of the treaty'.s lack of conformity 
with eonstitution by virtue of substantive failures in its ratification may 
be achieved by two means: 
a) a request for a statement of lack of conformity with the eonstitu­
tion, made by the President of the Government, the Nation's defen­
sor (Ombudsman), fifty members of eongress or fifty senators, and
the Autonomous eommunities' Assemblies whenever the treaty is
related to them, within three months from its official publication
(arts. 29-1, 31 and 34 of the eonstitutional eourt Organic Law).
b) the question of lack of conformity with the eonstitution can be
raised by a judge or court, on his or its own initiative or at the
request of one of the parties at any time he considers the norm
applicable to the case contrary to the eonstitution , once the pro­
ceedings are finished and befare verdict is passed (arts. 29-1, 35
and 37 of the eonstitutional eourt Organic Law).
The eonstitutional eourt's statement of a lack of conformity with the 
eonstitution entails the nullification of the norms contrary to the eonsti­
tution and binds all Public Powers (arts. 38 and 39 of the eonstitutional 
eourt Organic Law). 
In short, according to art. 46-1 of the Vienna eonvention of 1969, the 
consequence of the violation of internal norms related to the conclusion 
of treaties, whenever it is clear and affects fundamental norms, is the nul­
lification of such a treaty. In our domestic law, the consequence of the vio­
lation of constitutional norms relating to the conclusion of treaties is a 
declaration of lack of conformity with the eonstitution, which implies the 
nullification of the treaty concluded without observing our eonstitution. 
We will go over this second point in 1.2.7. Finally, it is necessary to 
say that according to art. 29 eeOL an appeal based on a formal lack of 
conformity with the eonstitution does not prevent another one based on 
substantive reasons from being lodged. 
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1.1.9. Do the national rules regarding the conclusion aj treaties con­
jorm with the Vienna Convention on the Law aj Treaties? 
The answer is positive. 
Toe adherence of Spain to the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969, in 
force since 27 January 1980, took place on 16 May 1972. Before this, 
Decree 801/1972 of 24 March on the activity of the Administration in the 
field of international treaties was published. Its Preamble states that: 
" ... the Administration's need for regulations in the field of international 
relations has grown taking into account the progressive development 
and codification of international norms on treaties, which has led to the 
adoption of the Vienna Convention. For all these reasons regulations are 
necessary to control the activity of the Administration in this field taking 
into account the requirements of the Administration itself as well as those 
of international practice". 
In short, Decree 801/1972 is inspired by the Vienna Convention and 
agrees with it. 
Nevertheless, such a preconstitutional Decree was not completely in 
accordance with the Constitutional requirements, and for this reason 
Titles V and VI were abolished. It is highly desirable there should soon be 
published a law on treaties that, in conformity with the Constitution, 
could replace Decree 801/1972. 
Although we do not properly consider it as something contrary to 
the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties, it is excessive to 
consider as representatives of the State of Spain persons without full 
powers to act as such. According to art. 5 of Decree 801/1972, the follow­
ing subjects may act as representatives of the State of Spain: 
"a) The Head of State, the President of the Government and the Foreign 
Affairs Minister to execute any international act regarding a treaty; b) the 
Chiefs of the diplomatic missions and those of permanent missions in 
international organisations, for negotiation, adoption and authentication 
of the treaty's text between Spain and the State or international organisa­
tion where they have been accepted; e) the Chiefs of special missions sent 
to one or severa! foreign States for the negotiation, adoption and authen­
tication of a treaty's text between Spain and any other State where the 
mission has been sent; d) the representatives accepted in an international 
meeting or organisation or one of its organs for the negotiation, adoption 
and authentication of the treaty's text elaborated in that meeting, organi­
sation or organ". 
If we compare this article with art. 7-2 of the Vienna Convention, it is 
clear that also Chiefs of special missions are supposed to have full pow­
ers under our domestic law. According to paragraphs b) and d) of the 
same article, that extension also stands for a treaty's act of authentication. 
Other specifications are also in conformity with the Vienna Conven­
tion though it does not say anything about them, as the one established 
by a Letter of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (No. 2882) of 28 November 
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1977 saying that bilateral treaties ratified by Spain should be authenti­
cated in Spanish, though other languages may be also authentic. 
1.2. The Interventíon of Parliament 
1.2.1. Is the participatíon of Parliament mandatortJ ar optíonal to 
enable the State to assume internatíonal obligatíons? 
Parliament's participation is a mandatory requirement for the conclusion 
of treaties included in arts. 93 and 94-1 SC. 
eongress and Senate do not participate in the conclusion of other 
treaties (those included in art. 94-2 SC), but they receive reports concem­
ing the treaties afterwards. 
Parliament's compulsory participation, when required by eonstitu­
tion (arts. 93 and 94-1 SC), takes the form of prior authorization. 
1.2.2. Can such participatíon be only tacit? 
Our eonstitution does not admit Parliament's "tacit" authorization for 
those treaties which require it (by tacit authorization we understand Par­
liament's implied agreement when no debate or proposals for rejection, 
postponement, or reservation are reglamentarily required within a certain 
time from the treaty's deposition in the ehambers). Furthermore, the eon­
stitution prevents such a solution by excluding the possible delegation of 
bills or proposals of international affairs from the Plenary sessions of the 
ehambers to the Permanent Legislative eommisions (art. 75-3 SC). 
On the other hand, in the debates of 1981 on the Draft Regulations for 
eongress a request was made for the inclusion of tacit authorization -
Parliament's implied agreement if no answer was given in sixty days 
from the demand for authorization - for treaties listed in art. 94-1 se, 
but this proposal was rejected on the grounds of incompatibility with art. 
74-2 se, which implies an obligation for explicit authorization at least for
treaties listed in art. 94-1 se. eongress was requested, in consideration of
this, to take a decision in such terms (art. 155-4 Regulations for eongress).
Authorization must be also explicit for treaties mentioned in art. 93 SC.
In short, the Spanish eonstitution does not admit tacit authorization. 
Parliament's authorization, when required by the eonstitution (arts. 93 
and 94-1 SC), must be always explicit and granted as we shall see in 1.2.3. 
1.2.3. If not, what form does Parliamentan; participatíon take (type 
of law, secondary legislatíon, etc.)? 
Parliamentary authorization modalities differ between treaties of art. 93 
SC and treaties of art. 94-1 SC. 
In the first case, Parliamentary authorization must be granted by 
means of an organic law. 
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In the second case, Parliamentary authorization is to be adopted 
according to art. 74-2 SC.; no legislation is required here. It is a simple 
parliamentary act of approval. 
1.2.4. What are the technical means far adoption of the Parliamen­
tanJ decision (majority, possibility of amendment, etc.)? 
Authorization to conclude treaties listed in art. 93 se must be adopted by 
means of an organic law. 
Neither the eonstitution nor Parliamentary Regulations establish 
any special voting procedure for these organic laws of authorization. On 
the contrary, art. 154 of the Regulations of eongress explicitly says that 
procedure for organic laws of authorizaton will be identical to those of 
the same normative rank. Therefore, the steps will be: 1) consent in a final 
vote on the whole bill by absolute majority of the members of eongress 
(art. 81-2 SC); 2) transfer of the bill to the Senate so that the Senate may­
if it wishes - veto it or propase modifications within two months from 
reception (twenty days in the case of a declaration of urgency). To pass a 
veto proposal, an absolute majority of senators is needed; and 3) return to 
eongress in case of veto or modifications. According to art. 90 se a sim­
ple majority is needed to overcome the modification proposals and an 
absolute majority is needed to overcome a veto within the first two 
months; after two months, a simple majority is enough. 
Authorization to conclude treaties included in art. 94-1 se will be 
adopted according to a special procedure regulated by art. 74-2 SC. 
According to art. 74-2 se the eongress and Senate will separately 
grant authorization for conclusion by simple majority; in case of disa­
greement, a mixed eommission will be formed to present a new text to 
both ehambers; if not passed, eongress will decide by an absolute major­
ity. 
Finally, we may underline the comparative absurdity produced in 
the case of differences between the ehambers. If it is the case of an inter­
national eonvention that has to follow the steps of art. 93 se, an absolute 
majority of eongress members is required for its prior authorization; but 
if the Senate differs from the eongress, the eongress will decide in last 
instance by a simple majority. On the contrary, in cases of treaties listed in 
art. 94-1 SC a simple majority of both ehambers is required, and in case 
of differences, the eongress will decide by absolute majority. 
This last hypothesis may lead us to a limit situation produced when 
the eongress, by simple majority, decides upan a treaty's ratification; the 
Sena te also decides the treaty's ratification but with a reservation; after­
wards, the Mixed eomission does not come to an arrangement; and eon­
gress does not achieve an absolute majority either for the simple 
authorization or for the authorization with a reservation; in this case, Par­
liament's prior authorization should be denied. 
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1.2.5. Is Parliament informed of reservations ar interpretative decla­
rations which are to be made by the executive? 
The Congress and Senate, when parliamentary authorization is required, 
do have the right to be informed of the Govemment's possible reserva­
tions or interpretative declarations to that treaty, as implied in art. 20-3 
and 26 of Decree 801/1972 and art. 155-2 of the Regulations of Congress. 
According to the first of them, both Chambers have also the right to be in­
formed of the reservations already made by the other States. 
The Government must therefore provide such information. 
We may wonder if our Legislative Chambers have only a right to be 
informed or have also competences regarding reservations and formula­
tion of declarations, contents, etc, in relation to treaties whose conclusion 
requires Parliament's authorization. 
1.2.6. Has Parliament any power in respect of such reservations? 
Our Constitution does not clearly say anything on this subject. Neverthe­
less, according to the democratic spirit of the Constitution, there are no 
reasons to consider a Government's exclusive competence in this matter. 
Furthermore, the unilateral character of reservations, as well as the mo­
ment for presenting them - at the conclusion of the treaty - favour Par­
liamentary participation in the determination of their number and 
content, whenever the Chambers' authorization is required. 
Two cases should be considered: 
a)Parliament's participation in reservations made by the Govern­
ment. 
Parliament must be notified of such reservations, and it must be sup­
plied with the treaty's text and the other documents needed for begin­
ning the parliamentary process (arts. 20-3 and 26 of Decree 801/1972 and 
155-2 of the Regulations of Congress).
Reservations may be discussed according to the procedure for dis-
cussing bill's articles. Art 156-3 of the Regulations of Congress says that: 
"proposals of members of Congress or parliamentary groups will be con­
sidered amendments when they intend to achieve the abolition, addition 
or modification of the Government's reservations". 
Although the Regulations of the Senate do not include a similar and 
complementary regulation, senators may discuss the reservations and 
declarations already passed by the Congress. In case of disagreement, a 
solution will be taken according to constitutional mechanisms. 
b)Proposals of reservation presented by members of the Congress
and Senate once the treaty has been transferred to Parliament. 
Such a right is regulated by the Regulations of the Congress (art. 156-
2 and 3) and the Regulations of the Senate (art. 144-1 and 3). Two proce­
dures are distinguished: 
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• if the reservation proposed is allowed by the treaty, it will be con­
sidered an amendment to the articles of the treaty (art. 156-2-2 Reg­
ulations of the eongress).
• if the reservation proposed is not allowed by the treaty, it will be
considered an amendment to the whole treaty (art. 156-3-2 Regula­
tions of the eongress).
On the other hand, art. 144-3 of the Regulations of the Senate says 
that "reservation proposals can only be formulated to those treaties or 
conventions that do allow them" and must follow "the established sys­
tem for all amendments under the ordinary legislative procedures". 
The Regulations of the Senate do not mention the forbidden reserva­
tion proposals, but the same objective is aimed at with the so-called no 
ratification proposals (art. 144-1 Regulations of Senate), that is to say, the 
denial of the authorization demanded by Government. 
Finally, once the treaty's conclusion has been decided by the Govern­
ment, it must be done with the reservations and declarations passed by 
Parliament, with no omission, modification or addition. 
All this only relates to treaties listed in arts. 93 or 94-1 se, where Par­
liamentary authorization is an essential requirement for their conclusion. 
1.2.7. What sanctíon exists far failure to observe the rules requiring 
Parliamentary participatíon in the treaty making process? 
This question has been already seen in 1.1.8. 
A treaty may violate the constitutional norms or the norms of devel­
opment that regulate Parliament's participation in the conclusion of trea­
ties - internal norms of great importance, especially when Parliament's 
authorization is required by the eonstitution (arts. 93 and 94-1). From an 
international point of view, such a violation, if clear, entails the nullifica­
tion of that treaty (art. 46-1 of the Vienna eonvention of 23 May 1969). 
From a national point of view, such a violation implies a demand for 
a statement of lack of conformity with the eonstitution from the eonsti­
tutional eourt (arts. 27-2-c. and 29 of the eonstitutional eourt Organic 
Law). It is called formal lack of conformity with the eonstitution. 
It is necessary to distinguish between a substantive lack of conform­
ity with the eonstitution - which admits a prior control over the treaty's 
conclusion according to art 95-2 se (see 1.1.5.) - and a formal lack of 
conformity with it, which may only be checked after the treaty's conclu­
sion. 
As we saw in 1.1.8. such a declaration may be requested by two 
means: either an appeal or a suit for a statement of lack of conformity 
with eonstitution. In both cases, an affirmative judgment entails the nul­
lification of the articles contrary to it, binding all public powers (arts. 38 
and 39 eeOL). 
In short, failure to observe constitutional norms that regulate Parlia­
ment's participation regarding the conclusion of treaties takes us to a pos­
sible declaration of lack of conformity with the eonstitution, which 
204 R. Bermejo García, V. Bou Ftanclt, C. Valdés Días, J.A.Paja Burgoa 
means the nullification of every treaty concluded without observing the 
requirements set by the eonstitution. This would be the case of a treaty 
being concluded without Parliament's authorization - if required - or 
with Parliament's simple agreement when an organic law is required. 
1.3. The Interventíon of the Electorate 
1.3.1. In what circumstances may the electorate participate in the 
procedure far the conclusion of treaties? 
Toe Spanish eonstitution does not explicitly regulate the electorate's par­
ticipation in the conclusion of treaties. 
According to art. 92 se, the King, at the request of the President of 
Government, will be able to submit political decisions of special impor­
tance to a referendum. Anyway it is an optional consultation whose result 
does not bind the Government. 
At any time the conclusion of a certain treaty is considered "a politi­
cal decision of special importance", art. 92 se will come into application. 
A referendum will be called only at the request of the President of the 
Government. There is no organ set by the eonstitution with the power to 
oblige the President of the Government to propose a referendum or to 
take the initiative in his stead. Notwithstanding, such an initiative is not 
unlimited. First, because the President's proposal for a "consultative ref­
erendum" must be authorized by agreement of the eouncil of Ministers; 
second, because holding this kind of referendum requires also eongress's 
authorization by an absolute majority, at the request of the President of 
the Government. And that request will contain the exact content of the 
consultation (arts. 2 and 6 of Organic Law 2/1980, of 18 January, on the 
regulation of the different kinds of referencia). 
In short and considering the domestic regulation on this subject (art. 
92 Se; Organic Law 2/1980, of 18 January, on the regulation of the differ­
ent kinds of referencia, partially modified by the Organic Law 12/1980, of 
16 December) we can state that: 
1) There is no obstacle to call a referendum on a decision of special
importance related to foreign policy, since no matter has been previ­
ously excluded;
2) The doctrinal determination of a certain decision as a "question of
special importance" has no practica! interest, since any question that
the President of the Government decides to submit to a referendum
with the consent of eongress will be considered of "special impor­
tance";
3) Toe initiative only rests with the President of the Government,
whose judgement of opportunity cannot be replaced by any other
organ. Practice shows that since the adoption of the eonstitution in
1978 we have adopted only once a "consultative referendum" under
art. 92 se and in that instance the "political decision of special impor­
tance" was related to an international treaty. Toe last Government of
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U.C.D. (Central Democratic Union) did join Spain to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on 30 May 1982. Five months
later, Government was assumed by the SWSP (Spanish Workers'
Socialist Party) that had previously criticized our NATO entrance.
For this reason, on 31 January 1986 the Council of Ministers passed
the President of the Government's proposal about a consultative ref­
erendum on the continuance of Spain in that Organisation, and it
asked Congress for parliamentary authorization afterwards.
The question asked in the referendum indicated the great discretional 
power of the President of the Government. In fact, the question was not a 
simple yes or no vote on NATO, as the important opposing parties had 
demanded. Instead, the question read as follows: 
"The Government considers appropriate for Spain to remain in the Atlan­
tic Alliance and it considers that such a continued presence should be 
maintained on the following conditions: 1) Our participation will not 
include incorporation into the military structure. 2) The prohibition of 
installation, storage or introduction of nuclear weapons into Spanish ter­
ritory will be maintained. 3) A progressive reduction of the military pre­
sence of the United States in Spain. 
Do you consider it appropriate for Spain to remain in the Atlantic 
Alliance on the terms arranged by the Government of the nation?". 
Congress granted its prior authorization on 5 February 1986, and the 
voting took place on 12 March. Results favoring the Government's opin­
ion (Yes votes, 52,49%; No votes, 39,84%; blank votes, 6,53%; invalid 
votes, 1,11 %) show that if a hypothetical "no" had been achieved a sec­
ond popular consultation would have had to be made in order to deter­
mine whether full incorporation or abandonment of the Atlantic Alliance 
was wanted. 
On the other hand, the internal ratification procedure for the Euro­
pean Treaty of Union, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, has 
clearly shown that it is only the President of the Government who has the 
power to call a "consultative referendum". In spite of the demand of a 
political party represented in Parliament for a referendum on this treaty, 
the President of the Government refused its request, even though recog­
nized that it was a political decision of special importance. 
1.3.2. What sanction exists far failure to observe the rules requiring 
the participation of the electorate? 
Taking into account the referendum's optional and non-binding character, 
no legal sanction is attributed to the violation of such norms. Any possible 
sanction would have only a political character. 
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1.4. Matters Subsequent to the EntnJ into Force of a Treaty 
1.4.1. Are there specific domestic rules relating to the adoption of 
amendments to a treaty? 
Spanish Law does not specifically regulate the adoption of amendments 
once the treaty is in force. Therefore, arts. 39-41 of the Vienna eonvention 
of 23 May 1969 should be applied. 
Art. 96-1 se, admitting the normative supremacy of international 
treaties, says that: 
"Their provisions may only be abolished, modified or suspended in the 
manner provided for in the treaties themselves or in accord with general 
norms of international law". 
There is a clear reference to international regulation in this matter. 
When an amendment is made to those treaties that need Parliament's 
authorization - those listed in arts. 93 or 94-1 se - must such amend­
ment follow the same parliamentary procedure as that required for the 
treaty's conclusion? 
Although our domestic law says nothing on this point - except the 
general references of art. 96-1 - we have to take into account that trea­
ties' amendments or modifications must also be inserted into a treaty of 
amendment or modification. Both treaties, as with any other intemational 
treaty concluded by Spain, are submitted to the requirements of art. 93 
and 94 SC. We may therefore classify them as those of art. 93 se ( extraor­
dinary authorization by means of an organic law), art. 94-1 se (simple 
authorization by decision of both Chambers) or art. 94-2 se (la ter report 
to both Chambers). This classification is different and independent from 
the one already made for the main treaty. Thus, in 1.1.2. we have already 
stated that not every treaty of amendment or modification of another 
treaty concluded as said in art. 93 SC must follow the same procedure; 
that will only occur when the treaty of amendment or modification 
attributes "to an international organisation or institution the exercise of 
competences derived from the Constitution". For the same reasons, for a 
treaty amending or modifying another previously concluded treaty (as 
laid clown in art. 94-1 SC) also to be concluded by the same procedure, it 
must be first classified as one of the kinds set in art. 94-1 SC; otherwise, a 
later report to the Chambers - as required in art. 94-2 se - will be 
enough. 
1.4.2. What domestic rules govern the denunciation or suspension of 
a treaty? 
It is art. 96 se that regulates both questions. 
Art. 96-1 se says that treaties' provisions "may only be[ ... ] sus­
pended in the manner provided for in the treaties themselves or in accord 
with general norms of intemational law". Our domestic legal order refers 
the whole question to intemational regulation. 
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Art 96-2 says that "[t]o denounce international treaties and agree­
ments, the same procedure established for their approval in Article 94 
shall be used." 
The existence of art. 96-2 SC is positive in spite of its bad drafting. 
Literally, art. 96-2 only relates to the denunciation of treaties included 
under art. 94 se, without saying anything about those listed in art. 93 SC. 
Therefore, according to art. 96-2 se denunciation of treaties listed 
under art. 94-1 se must follow the same parliamentary procedure and 
requirements set by the eonstitution that we have already seen for pass­
ing them (art. 74-2 SC) (See, supra, 1.2.4.). 
The same way, denunciation of treaties whose conclusion was not 
submitted to Parliament's authorization, must be immediately reported 
to the ehambers (art. 94-2 SC). 
As far as denunciation of treaties included in art. 93 se is concerned, 
art. 160 of Regulations of eongress should be considered in an interpreta­
tive way. Without distinguishing between the different kinds of treaties, it 
states that "when denunciation of a treaty or eonvention occurs, the 
same procedure as for concluding it must l;>e followed", which means 
that denunciation of treaties included in art. 93 se has to be authorized 
by an organic law. 
A short mention of art. 32-3 of Decree 801/1972 must be made. 
According to it: 
"The Foreign Affairs Ministry must adopt the necesary measures to 
publish in the OBS ... any other international act regarding the amend­
ment, modification, termination or suspension of the application of those 
treaties ratified by Spain". 
Finally, the Government and Parliament - when its authorization is 
needed - have to take into account that according to art. 96-1 se the stip­
ulations of those treaties part of our domestic law "may only be abolished 
... in accordance with those treaties' rules or with the general norms of 
international law", and therefore any denunciation that violates such 
norms will be illicit and contrary to the eonstitution. 
1.5. The Insertion of Treaties ínto Domestíc Law 
1.5.1. Does a regularly concluded treaty automatícally become part 
of domestíc law ar is an express act requíred? 
The Spanish system of reception could be classified as one of "moderate 
dualism". It is dualist because it requires a material act of reception so that 
a treaty may become part of our law. And it is moderate because for such 
an act of reception, publication in the OBS is enough - no transformation 
into a domestic law is required. 
This system is clearly stated by eonstitution in art. 96-1 se when it 
says that: 
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"Validly concluded international treaties once officially published in 
Spain shall constitute part of the interna! legal arder". 
Art. 1-5 of our Civil Code also says that: 
"intemational treaties' juridical norms will not be directly applied in 
Spain until they become part of interna! law through their publication in 
the Official Bulletin of the State". 
As we shall see infra in 1.5.2. the value attributed by our case law to 
the treaties' official act of publication makes our domestic system of 
insertion qualified, though formally dualistic, with monistic characters in 
practice. 
1.5.2. Assuming an express act is required, what is the nature of this 
act? 
According to art. 96-1 SC treaties' official publication is ordered to insert 
their juridical norms into our domestic law, making possible their direct 
application in Spain, as art. 1-5 CC establishes. In no way must this official 
publication be identified with a transformation of the treaty into an inter­
na! law. As far as the Supreme Court's case law is concemed, though trea­
ties' publication attributes to them "full effects in our domestic law" 
(Judgment of 30 September 1982), the Spanish system should be named as 
of "automatic reception" (Judgments of 19 May 1983 and 30 April 1986). 
According to art. 1-5 CC, treaties not published in the OBS should not 
be applied in Spain. Nevertheless, practice shows that administrative 
bodies of the Sta te have been applying a great number of international 
treaties in force and binding on Spain in spite of their absence or late pub­
lication in the OBS, thus paying attention to art. 27 of the Vienna Conven­
tion of 1969 when it says that: "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of 
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty". 
Furthermore, Spanish courts will also apply those treaties that 
despite their non-publication, are known by other means or by the partic­
ulars' proof of existence and validity -through certification of the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry for example. That is to say, since a treaty's lack of official 
publication does not prevent the Administration from applying it, like­
wise, non-publication will not be an obstacle for its application by the 
Courts either. At most, they may ask the person who invokes it to give 
proof of its existence and force. 
On the other hand, and as a citizens' guarantee, the Supreme Court's 
case law has stated that no sanction may be imposed for not observing a 
right contained in a treaty not published yet. In this sense, a Judgment of 
12 March 1985 nullified a sanction imposed on a citizen that was based on 
nonobservance of a disposition that had not been published in the OBS. 
In short, domestic practice - administrative or judicial - shows that 
official publication is only a requirement for application whenever that 
treaty contains dispositions that imply citizens' obligations or affect their 
rights or interests. In this case the official publication of such treaties is a 
requirement for their application. 
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1.5.3. What criteria are used by the judge to determine whether a 
treaty provision is directly applicable? 
As already seen supra in 1.5.2. a:nd from a formal point of view (art. 1-5 
CC.), intemational treaties' legal norms must be published by the OBS in 
order to be directly applied in Spain. Neither judges nor courts can apply 
a conventional norm if it has not been previously published in the OBS. 
Nevertheless, as also seen in 1.5.2., practice shows that courts, in 
accordance with the Supreme Court's case law, have been applying those 
intemational treaties concluded by Spain and not published whose exist­
ence, contents and validity are proved by the interested party, with the 
sole exception of those treaties that relate to citizens' obligations; in this 
case, the treaty's lack of publication may be cited to question its applica­
bility. 
1.5.4. When domestic measures to implement the treaty are required, 
at what stage in the procedure and by what type aj legislation (pri­
mary ar secondary) are they adopted? 
The direct application of conventional norms of international treaties re­
quires, in the first instance, the treaty's intemational enforcement and 
publication in the OBS, but the application depends, above ali, on the trea-
ties' self or non self-executing character. 
In the first case they will be directly applied with no need for other 
executing measures. 
In the second case, despite their inclusion in our domestic law from 
the treaty's official publication, those non-executing norms need a legal 
or / and reglamentary implementation to be applied. Therefore, when 
conventional dispositions are not "self executing", their application 
requires the adoption and publication of lower laws and norms which 
develop them. In our domestic legal order, in spite of the precedent his­
tory of our Constitutions, there is no norm saying when those legal or 
reglamentary dispositions must be adopted. In this sense, we may under­
line art. 65-2 of the Republican Constitution of 12 December 1931, which 
says: 
"After ratifying an international Convention which affects the legal orga­
nisation of the State, the Government will hand to Congress the neces­
sary draft laws needed for the execution of its norms in a short period of 
time". 
Generally speaking, the adoption of such executing measures will 
take place after the treaty's enforcement and publication in the OBS, but it 
is also possible to require the adoption of such measures before becoming 
a party to that treaty. 
Art. 93 SC shows the existence of "non self-executing" conventional 
norms or treaties in our law when it says: 
"It is the responsibility of the Cortes Generals [Parliament] or the 
Government, depending on the cases, to guarantee compliance with 
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these treaties [those which attribute to international organisations or ins­
titutions the exercise of competences derived from the Constitution] and 
the resolutions emanating from the international or supranational organi­
sations who have been entitled by this cession". 
Likewise, among the treaties which require prior parliamentary 
authorization for their conclusion, art. 94-1 e) se includes those which 
will require legislative measures for their execution. 
On the other hand, the attribution of the above mentioned guarantee 
to Government or Parliament, according to the cases, not only refers to 
treaties which transfer to international organisations or institutions the 
exercise of constitutional competences, as seen in art. 93 se, but also 
refers to any other treaty with the same executing problems. 
As a general rule, legislative measures of execution are adopted by 
Parliament while reglamentary ones are adopted by the Government. 
Finally, Parliament may delegate to the Government the execution of 
treaties, in the terms set by art. 82-3 Se: this delegation must be non­
transferable, express, concrete, and time-limited. A good example is Law 
47 /1985 of 27 December on the delegation to Government of the adapta­
tion of our law to the obligations arising from the Spanish adherence to 
the European eommunities. It was granted for six months and it was 
restricted to a list of legal texts numbered in the enclosed documents. 
On the other hand, problems between the legal or reglamentary 
implementation of conventional dispositions are not only produced 
between Parliament and the Government. We have to take into account 
the complex territorial structure of the Spanish State which derives from 
the eonstitution of 1978. Art. 96-1 se establishes treaties' immediate 
reception and direct application in the whole national territory once offi­
cially published. But when conventional dispositions are not self-execut­
ing, it is necessary to count on the governmental and assembly organs of 
the Autonomous eommunities. 
Our eonstitution does not explicitly recognize Autonomous eom­
munities' competence to execute international treaties. An indirect recog­
nition does exist in art. 93 se, last paragraph. This article states that, 
depending on the case, it is Parliament or eongress which will vouchsafe 
the performance of treaties and international organisations' resolutions. 
But the safeguarding of performance by the central organs of the State 
(Parliament or the Government) does not necessarily imply that it is them 
who must fulfil such norms. 
For this reason, the Autonomous eommunities assumed compe­
tences in the execution of international treaties when the seventeen Stat­
utes of Autonomy were passed. Nevertheless, the final result shows a 
great diversity of treatment in the drafting of the seventeen Statutes. In 
general, there exist seven Statutes of Autonomy in our country that 
attribute to their Autonomous eommunities plenary competences in the 
execution of international treaties (The Basque eountry, eatalonia, Anda­
lusia, Aragon, eastile-La Mancha, eanary Islands and Madrid). There 
also exist six Autonomous eommunities whose Statutes attribute to them 
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limited competences in the execution of treaties, generally subordinated 
to the State's legislation and reglamentation (Asturias, Navarre, Estrema­
dura, Balearic Islands, Castile-Leon and Murcia). Finally, there are also 
four Autonomous Communities that do not say anything explicitly on 
this subject (Galicia, Cantabria, La Rioja and Valencia). Making it more 
difficult to understand, two of the already mentioned Statutes of Auton­
omy do explicitly contemplate the execution of international organisa­
tions' resolutions. 
This situation immediately produced a debate on the Autonomous 
Communities' role in the execution of international norms. For a certain 
part of our doctrine, it is only those Autonomous Communities which 
explicitly regulate the competence to execute international norms in their 
Statutes of Autonomy that may do so. But another part of our doctrine, 
more and more important, says that it really depends on the competence 
of that Autonomous Community in the field of the treaty; if it'were so, it 
could develop it by legislative or reglamentary means, no matter whether 
or not it had expressly recognized the competence to execute inter­
national norms. This discussion carne to an end when our Constitutional 
Court, in Judgment 252/1988, of 20 December, stated that: 
"it is the domestic norms that must solve conflicts between the State and 
Autonomous Communities, who cannot enlarge, for this reason, the 
scope of their competences by means of an international link. Statutory 
norms, like art. 27-3 of the Statute of Automy of Catalonia which rules 
that the Autonomous Community will adopt the necessary measures for 
the execution of international treaties relative to matters in its field of 
competence are not norms which attribute a new competence, different 
from the one that as already stated in other norms is held by the Genera­
litat". 
In short, the execution of a treaty by means of law, regulation, legisla­
tive delegation, etc., belongs not only to the State, but also to the Autono­
mous Communities. In addition to the example given, we may mention 
the Basque Parliament's Law 2/1986, of 19 February, on the reception of 
the European Communities' law in the Basque Autonomous Community, 
or the Catalonian Parliament's Law 4/1986, of 10 March, for the adapta­
tion of Catalonian laws to EC law. 
On the other hand, when Autonomous Communities with compe­
tence in that field refuse to execute an intemational treaty, or do execute it 
but in the wrong way or too late, apart from the strong measures of con­
trol (harmonization laws, art. 150-3 SC; measures of obligatory perform­
ance, art. 155 SC, etc.), the State's law prevails and supplies Autonomic 
law according to art. 149-3 SC. Thus, the State's possible international 
responsibility for a hypothetical lack of performance by an Autonomous 
Community is avoided. 
1.5.5. When an express act is required and has not taken place in 
respect of a duly ratified treaty, what effect, if any, does the treaty 
have in domes tic law? 
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As seen supra in 1.5.1. a treaty's lack of publication, when it has been val­
idly concluded by the Spanish State and intemationally enforced does not 
prevent its application at a national level. The Supreme Court's case law, 
observing art. 27 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 and also trying to 
avoid the intemational responsability of Spain, labels our intemational 
law reception system as of "automatic reception". 
We have also noted that a great number of international treaties have 
been applied by administrative bodies of the State despite their lack of 
publication in the OBS. 
Spanish courts have done likewise after the party's proof of exist­
ence, contents and validity. An exception must be made for those treaties 
which imply citizens' obligations. Here, if the application is considered 
harmful, citizens may successfully cite the lack of official publication. 
In short, according to Spanish practice, the lack of official publication 
only implies the citizens' opposition when this is stated by them. 
1.5.6. Does the executive determine the date on which the treaty 
takes effect in domestic law? If so, what means does it employ to this 
end? 
If from a formal point of view, and according to art. 1-5 CC, the direct ap­
plication of the legal norms contained in international treaties depend on 
their publication in the OBS, it is clear that it is the Government, when de­
ciding upon the treaty's publication date, which also decides its date of 
application in our domestic law. This means that the Government, once 
the treaty is internationally enforced, could deliberately delay its publica­
tion in the OBS, delaying therefore its direct application in our interna! 
law. 
Nevertheless, apart from the practica! problems of synchronization 
between the intemational enforcement of a treaty and its official publica­
tion which such a delay would create, an attitude of this sort is also con­
trary to arts. 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention of 1969, which says that 
"[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be per­
formed by them in good faith" with no possibility of invoking "the provi­
sions of its interna! law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty". 
Besides, though our system of reception should be considered according 
to arts. 96-1 se and 1-5 ce as a system of "moderate dualism", from a 
practica! point of view - in fact - it works as an automatic reception 
system, as the Supreme Court's case law has stated. In consequence, the 
treaty's effects do start from the international enforcement date notwith­
standing its date of publication. 
Therefore, the Government's delaying of the official publication of a 
treaty internationally in force will not prevent it from being applied in 
our intemal law. 
In this sense, art. 31 of Decree 801/72 says that apárt from the treaty's 
text and complementary documentation there must be published 
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" ... a communication indicating the treaty's binding date signed by the 
General Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry". 
From such an article we can deduce that the enforcement date is 
identical to the application date. In this way it is usual to see published in 
the OBS the treaty's text with the mentioned communication where the 
treaty's binding date appears (which will always precede the publication 
date). 
Similar dispositions also exist for treaties whose application is par­
tially or completely provisional. In this case, the treaty's text must be 
published with the communication of the General Secretary of the For­
eign Affairs Ministry stating the date of its provisional application. Later 
on, the date of its full application or the date of the end of its provisional 
application, as appropriate, will be published (arts. 30 and 31 of Decree 
801/72). 
A different point is, as mentioned before, that the Government is not 
obliged to ratify the treaty after Parliament's prior authorization. The 
only risk is Parliament's withdrawal of its authorization. In this way the 
executive may condition the start of a treaty's direct application in Spain, 
since without its approval, the treaty will not be in force for Spain. 
1.5.7. Is there any requirement that the treaty should be published 
officially ar given publícity by sorne other means? 
See supra 1.5.1. and 1.5.6. as far as official publication of treaties is con­
cerned (arts. 96-1 SC and 1-5 CC). 
Art. 29 of the Decree 801/72 says: 
"Those treaties to which Spain is a party will be published in the OBS. 
Publication will take place: l. Through the insertion of the whole text of 
ratification or adherence to that treaty. 2. Through the insertion of the 
whole text of the treaty (be it a unique instrument or connected instru­
ments) as well as the reservations or declarations adopted and any other 
complementary document". 
According to art. 31 of the same Decree, after the texts mentioned in 
art. 29, a communication with the treaty's binding date signed by the 
General Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry must also be published. 
Second, according to art. 32 of Decree 801/72, the General Secretary 
of the Foreign Affairs Ministry will periodically publish in the OBS com­
munications relating to: a) other States' participation in multilateral trea­
ties signed by Spain, including where appropriate those States' 
reservations and the objections made by Spain to them; b) the removal of 
Spanish or other States' reservations to multilateral treaties ratified by 
Spain; ande) any other international act relative to the amendment, mod­
ification, termination or suspension of the application of treaties ratified 
by Spain. 
Third, and regardless of its publication in the OBS, the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry has three tasks (art. 34 of Decree 801/72): a) the periodi­
cal publication of treaty collections ratified by Spain (it is carried on by 
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means of yearly census of treaties ratified by Spain); b) the periodical 
publication of a list of treaties in force and mandatory for Spain (this task 
is not carried out because of its technical difficulties); ande) the establish­
ment of databases relative to treaties (this task is developed by the Trea­
ties Registration Office of the Foreign Affairs Ministry). 
Finally, and regardless of the previous internal ways of achieving 
publicity for treaties, art. 28 of Decree 801/72 states the obligation of the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry to follow art. 102 of the United Nations Charter 
regarding the registration of treaties concluded by Spain at the Organisa­
tion' s Secretariat. 
1.5.8. What sanction exists far lack of publicity? 
As already seen, the lack of publication of an intemationally enforced trea­
ty does not prevent it from being applied. Its only effect is the inapplica­
bility of such a treaty to citizens whenever it implies duties or obligations 
for them. 
In fact, publication is only a condition of application of such treaties 
to citizens . 
1.5.9. By what methods or procedures are interested parties informed 
of various matters regarding the application of a treaty, far example, 
entrtJ into force, parties to a treaty, reservations, or suspension or ter­
mination of a treaty, etc.? 
In Spanish Law, it is the Foreign Affairs Ministry that must take care of the 
publicity for every question relating to those treaties ratified by Spain (see 
arts. 31, 32 and 34 of Decree 801/72). 
According to art. 31 of the same Decree, there must also be published, 
after the text of the treaty, a communication with the treaty's binding date 
signed by the General Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 
On the other hand, art 32 says: 
"The Foreign Affairs Ministry will take the necessary steps to publish in 
the OBS communications signed by the General Secretary of the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry relative to: 1. The foreign participation in those multila­
teral treaties ratified by Spain as well as those States' reservations and the 
Spanish position towards them. 2. The withdrawal of Spanish or foreign 
reservations from those multilateral treaties ratified by Spain. 3. Any 
other international act regarding the amendment, modification, postpo­
nement or termination of treaties ratified by Spain". 
Finally, art. 34 states: 
"Despite their publication in the OBS, in order to facilitate citizens' 
knowledge of international obligations assumed by Spain, the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry must take the necessary steps to achieve: a) the periodi­
cal publication of a compilation of treaties ratified by Spain. b) the perio­
dical publication of a list of enforced treaties binding for Spain. e) the 
establishment of databases relating to treaties". 
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1.5.10. What place does the treaty have in the domestic legal hierar­
chy? 
Art. 96-1 se says that internation.al treaties' norms, when validly conclud­
ed bySpain 
"may only be abolished, modified or suspended in the manner provided 
for in the treaties themselves or in accord with general norms of interna­
tional law". 
This article therefore sanctions the treaties' supremacy over any 
internal regulation of lower rank than the eonstitution, be it prior or sub­
sequent to them. 
This last sentence of art. 96-1 se is very important because it shows 
that the abolition, modification or postponement of a treaty cannot be 
achieved by means of a law or a normative disposition of lower rank. 
In short, in our law, international treaties hold the highest normative 
rank (above national ordinary or organic laws) after the eonstitution -
"[t]he conclusion of an international treaty which contains stipulations 
contrary to the eonstitution shall require a prior constitutional revision" 
(art. 95-1 SC) -. 
Finally, both the eonstitutional and the Supreme eourt have con­
firmed "the superior hierarchical rank" of international treaties. 
In addition to this, we have to stress that the Spanish eonstitution 
attributes a higher value to a certain kind of international treaties. 
According to art. 10-2: 
"The norms relative to basic rights and liberties which are recognized by 
the Constitution, shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and agree­
ments on those matters ratified by Spain". 
We may conclude from this disposition that all treaties on human 
rights ratified by Spain have a double value: on one hand, and according 
to art. 96-1 se, they are international treaties, part of our domestic law 
with a higher rank than that held by norms with force of law; on the other 
hand, they are interpretative criteria of the Spanish eonstitution. 
Right after the adoption of the eonstitution of 1978, our Supreme 
eourt's case law misunderstood the scope of art. 10-2 se, since it only 
attributed an interpretative value to those treaties, leaving aside their 
supralegal rank. This mistake was immediately corrected by the eonsti­
tutional eourt, who interpreted in a broad sense art. 10-2 se, recognizing 
such an interpretative value for different resolutions on human rights of 
several international organisations, that differed from the Universal Dec­
laration. Nevertheless, and in at least two recent judgments (Judgments 
64/1991, of 22 March, and 145/1991, of 1 July) our eonstitutional eourt 
has made the same mistake that it had previously corrected recognizing 
for arts. 40-3-2 and 119 of the EEe eonstitutive Treaty only an interpreta­
tive value of the se, by virtue of art. 10-2, forgetting their character as 
conventional norms. 
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1.5.11. What is the general attitude of judges towards international 
treaty obligations? Is there a distinction between different types of 
court? 
Toe attitude of Spanish judges and courts, without distinction of courts, 
towards international provisions of a conventional character that entail 
the State is of complete observance and strict application. 
It is known that according to art. 96-1 SC "[v]alidly concluded inter­
national treaties once officially published in Spain shall constitute part of 
the interna! legal arder". In consequence, from that moment (official pub­
lication) onwards, their provisions must be known and applied by courts, 
especially taking into account their normative rank, as stated in art. 96-1 
se. 
In this sense, art. 1�5 CC alludes to the direct application of interna­
tional treaties' legal norms in Spain after their complete publication in the 
OBS. 
Therefore, according to art. 96-1 SC. and art. 1-5 CC Spanish judges 
and courts must know and apply international treaties validly concluded 
by the State after their official publication. 
We can raise the question whether Spanish judges and courts have a 
duty to apply the provisions of those treaties that though validly con­
cluded by the Spanish State and internationally enforced, have not yet 
been officially published. 
Practice shows that judges and courts, following the Supreme 
Court's case law and in accordance with art. 27 of the Vienna Convention 
of 1969 and also to prevent international responsibility of the State, have 
been applying, despite the lack of official publication, those treaties inter­
nationally in force far Spain, with the sale condition of proof of their 
existence, contents and validity through Foreign Affairs Ministry certifi­
cation or by any other legal means. 
Furthermore, Spanish judges and courts cannot avoid the application 
of an internatinal treaty's provisions on grounds of lack of official publi­
cation, since the Vienna Convention of 1969, adherence to which by Spain 
took place on 16 May 1972 and internationally in force from 27 January 
1980 prohibits in art. 27 the invocation of norms of domestic law (in this 
case lack of publication) to justify the nonobservance of a treaty. Such a 
Convention is part of our internal law since its publication in the OBS (13 
June 1980) and may be therefore directly applied in Spain according to 
art. 1-5 ce. 
Thus, arts. 96-1 SC and 1-5 CC take an approach to the application of 
an international conventional provision that paradoxically excludes the 
possibility of citing the articles quoted and the lack of official publication 
in last instance as a justification far violating an international treaty in 
force far Spain. 
1.5.12. Does the judge check the constitutional regularity of the con­
clusion of the treaty? 
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Whenever Spanish judges and courts have doubts on the conformity with 
Constitution of a certain international treaty's provisions whose applica­
tion and validity relate directly to the judgment, they can request from the 
Constitutional Court a declaration of conformity with the Constitution for 
such provisions (art. 163 SC and arts. 27-1 e; 29-1 b and 35 of the Constitu­
tional Court Organic Law). 
Questions promoted by judges or courts may involve either a mate­
rial lack of conformity of a treaty with the Constitution (whenever its pro­
visions violate the substantive contents of the Constitution) or a formal 
one (whenever the constitutional proceeding of parliamentary authoriza­
tion for those treaties included in arts. 93 and 94-1 SC is not observed). 
1.5.13. Is the judge able to declare that a question arising in respect of 
a treaty is non-justiciable? 
Despite the non existence of a specific norm in our domestic law, the an­
swer must be negative according to art. 1-7 of the Civil Code, which says: 
"Judges and courts must always salve every case that they acknowledge, 
following the established system of sources". 
Therefore, even when doubts on an international treaty arise from a 
litigious question, Spanish judges will have to salve it. A different ques­
tion would be the possibility for those judges to stop the judicial proceed­
ings in course so that another entity may participate, whether through 
the question of conformity with the Constitution or through the prejudi­
cial question or through the mechanisms of "inquiries for a better provid­
ing". 
1.5.14. What procedure applies far the interpretation of a treaty in the 
context of domestic litigation (request to the executive, interpretation 
by the judge, referral to another court)? 
The interpretation of an intemational treaty's provisions in case of intemal 
litigation, of an administrative or judicial nature, must be done in accor­
dance with the rules set by the Vienna Convention of 1969; all the more so 
as Spain is a party to it. 
a) Interpretation by judicial bodies. Spanish judges and courts have
stated for a long time their competence to interpret intemational treaties; 
such an interpretation must be undertaken according to arts. 31-33 of the 
Vienna Convention. Such a wide freedom of Spanish judges and courts to 
interpret conventional provisions does not prevent them from using the 
"inquiries for better providing" to request from the Foreign Affairs Minis­
try or other Departments - such as the Justice Ministry - documents or 
information that may facilitate it. 
In any event, the interpretation of international treaties in case of 
interna! judicial litigation concerns in last instance the judicial court that 
has to resolve such litigation. It is not possible either to refer it to the exec­
utive power or to leave it up to anyone else, with the exception of the 
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"prejudicial questions" referred to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities for the interpretation of EC law (art. 177 of the European 
Economic Community Treaty and art. 150 of the European Atomic 
Energy Treaty). 
In this sense we must stress the insistence of our Constitutional Court 
on stating that it is not its function to control the adjustment of certain 
domestic normative acts to EC law. In Judgment 64/1991, of 22 March, it 
said: 
"The State's lawyer is right when he says that the Constitutional Court 
does not have to control the adjustment of the national public powers' 
activity to EC law. This control falls in the competence of the ordinary 
judiciary organs since they have to apply EC law and in last instance to 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities through an appeal 
over lack of fulfilment (art. 170 EECT). The task of guaranteing the cor­
red application of EC law by national public powers is therefore a ques­
tion that does not fall within the Constitutional field. As this Court 
recently stated, Spanish integration into the European Community 'does 
not mean that through art. 93, EC norms have achieved a constitutional 
rank or force and either does it mean that a possible violation of those 
norms by a Spanish disposition always involves a violation of art. 93 SC' 
(Judgment 28/1991 of the Constitutional Court)". 
b) Interpretation by administrative bodies. Their power of interpreta­
tion and later administrative application is limited by means of the neces­
sary consultation of the Council of State in plenary session, as art. 21-3 
and 4 of Organic Law 3/1980, of 22 April on the Council of Sta te, estab­
lishes: 
"The Council of State, in plenary session must be consulted on: ... 3) 
doubts and differences in the interpretation or performance of treaties, 
conventions or international agreements of which Spain is a party; 4) juri­
dical problems in the interpretation or performance of acts and agree­
ments of international or supranational organisations ... ". 
In short, we can state that judicial bodies do have the competence to 
interpret international treaties by themselves (see infra 1.5.16.), while 
administrative ones must consult the Council of State in plenary session 
whatever doubts or differences may arise when interpreting treaties. 
1.5.15. When a provisíon of domestic law is challenged in a court as 
contrary to a treaty, do the proceedings or the court's arder have a 
suspensive effect (as to the applicatíon of the law generally, ar only 
ínter partes)? 
Taking into account the supremacy of international conventional norms 
over those ones of domestic law (art. 96-1, last sentence, SC.t two solu­
tions may be adopted in case of mutual contradiction: 
a) Inapplicability of the internal norm contrary to the international
conventional norm. 
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In this case, the suspensive effect produced by the nonapplication of 
the internal nonn is only effective for that litigation - since such a non­
application does not mean its abolition - and does not therefore have a 
general character. 
b) Request for a statement of lack of conformity with the Constitution
from the Constitutional Court through the "question of lack of conform­
ity" (art. 163 SC., arts. 29-1 b and 35 of the Constitutional Court Organic 
Law), on grounds of violation of the constitutional principle of normative 
hierarchy regulated by art. 96-1, last sentence SC. (treaties' supremacy 
over domestic law). 
In this case the Constitutional Courts's statement of lack of conform­
ity of the internal norm with the Constitution will bind all Public Powers 
and will produce general effects (declaration of the nullity of the internal 
norm impugned: suspension of its validity and application) from its pub­
lication in the OBS (arts. 38-1 and 39-1 of the Constitutional Court 
Organic Law). 
1.5.16. By what methods does the judge interpret treaties? 
Spanish judges and courts must interpret international treaties according 
to arts. 31-33 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969, ratified by Spain. 
In consequence, they must take into account the unilateral interpretative 
declarations formulated at the text's authentication or at the treaty's con­
clusion, as well as the formal acts where Parliament's prior authorization, 
constitutionally required for conclusion, is shown. On the other hand, 
among the complementary means of interpretation, they must also take 
into account the agreement's background (for example, the debates prior 
to Parliament's authorization) and the development and implementation 
laws and regulations that have also to be interpreted according to the trea­
ty. 
1.5.17. What weight is given to the translated text of a treaty into the 
national language, when the only authentic versions are in other lan­
guages? 
According to art. 33-2 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969, "[a] ver­
sion of a treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was 
authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so 
provides or the parties so agree". 
Nevertheless, practice shows that administrative and judicial bodies 
interpret treaties according to the Spanish translation published in the 
OBS even when it is not one of the authentic texts at an international 
level. The reason is not only their lack of knowledge of foreign languages 
but also the legal norms' requirement for translation of foreign docu­
ments into Spanish in order for them to be applied by the judicial and 
administrative bodies. 
In our case this problem has little importance. The real importance of 
the Spanish language, one of the most widely spoken in the world and 
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even an official language in the United Nations determines that only a 
small number of multilateral treaties are not authenticated in Spanish. On 
the other hand, a Letter of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of 28 November 
1977 (No. 2882) said that all bilateral treaties concluded by Spain should 
be authenticated in Spanish, although other languages could be also con­
sidered as authentic. 
1.5.18. What attitude does the judge adopt when confronted with 
successive ar conflicting treaty obligations? 
According to a joint interpretation of arts. 30 and 59 of the Vienna Conven­
tion on the Law of Treaties, in case of successive treaties relating to the 
same subject-matter, the earlier treaty's provisions will only be applied if 
they are compatible with the later treaty's ones; in case of lack of confor­
mity- impossibility of applying both treaties at the same time - the ear­
lier treaty should be considered as terminated and its provisions tacitly 
abolished. 
Such an interpretation may be perfectly adopted by Spanish judicial 
bodies in the case of contradictory successive international conventional 
obligations on the same matter. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the validity of that interpretation, sometimes 
differences between the provisions of an earlier and a later treaty do not 
imply an absolute contradiction; in sorne cases, the continuity in force of 
an earlier treaty's provisions could be justified by the circumstances or 
the parties' intention. Therefore, it will first be necessary to know the par­
ties' will. In short, the lack of conformity of successive conventional pro­
visions relating to the same subject-matter will always imply the later 
treaty's application as far as the parties' will does not clearly differ or it is 
not possible to determine it. 
2. THE ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
2.1. Is it necessary to distinguish domestic law derived from EC law and 
that derived from other international organisations? 
There are clear differences between EC derived Law (normative acts of EC 
institutions) and the acts of other intemational organisations to which 
Spain also belongs. 
In 2.2 and 2.3 infra we shall consider those differences that come from 
the different degree of integration of Spain in various intemational organ­
isations. Integration into the European Communities is greater since it 
involves: a) a real sovereignty transfer to the EC Institutions, suprana­
tional bodies to which Spain attributes the exercise of exclusive campe-
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tences and b) the recognition of EC law's supremacy, its direct and 
immediate effectiveness. 
That level of integration is not achieved in other international organi­
sations to which Spain also belongs. 
2.2. Law derived from International Organisations (other than the Euro­
pean Communities) 
2.2.1. Is law derived from international organisations part of the 
domestic legal arder? If yes, how does it become part of domestic law? 
Apart from the European Communities, acts of those international organ­
isations to which Spain belongs and which are directly obligatory for all 
member States by virtue of their own constitutive treaties do become part 
of our domestic legal order. Proof of this explanation is art. 21-4 of Organic 
Law 3/1980, of 22 April, of the Council of State. According to it: 
"Plenary session of the Council of State must be consulted over the fol­
lowing matters: legal problems on the interpretation or application of 
acts and resolutions from international or supranational Organisations". 
It is clear that if the highest consultative body of the Spanish execu­
tive power must be consulted on how to interpret and/ or fulfil normative 
acts of international organisations which are mandatory for the Spanish 
State, it is because those acts and resolutions are part of our domestic 
legal order. 
But in this legal order neither the Constitution of 1978 nor other 
norms of lower rank explicitly regulate how to integrate international 
organisations' acts. Because of this normative blank, several authors 
understand that by means of an analogical interpretation with what is 
said about treaties in art. 96-1 SC and 1-5 Civil Code, we may conclude 
that international organisations' acts, directly mandatory by virtue of the 
same constitutive treaty, will become part of our domestic legal system 
once they have been completely published in the OBS; from that moment 
onwards they may be directly applied to citizens by the national judicial 
and administrative bodies even when the official publication has taken 
place before the constitutive treaty of the organisation. 
These doctrinal ideas are based on the Spanish Constitution, since 
only by acting that way could we fulfil art. 9-3 SC, which says: 
"The Constitution guarantees the principle of legality, the normative 
order, the publication of the norms, the non-retroactivity of punitive pro­
visions which are not favorable to, or which restrict individual rights; 
juridical security and the interdiction of arbitrariness of public powers". 
Nevertheless, we must say that it is the only norm in our whole legal 
system that speaks of the necessity of publishing binding normative acts 
adopted by international organisations to which Spain belongs. In these 
conditions, and following the usages prior to the Spanish Constitution, 
Spanish practice shows that none of these norma ti ve acts is officially pub-
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lished. This practice is not in accordance with the requirement of art. 9-3 
SC requesting publicity for the norms. 
Since they are not officially published, their integration into our 
domestic legal order is produced in several ways. For example, in the 
summer of 1979, the State's General Prosecutor filed a criminal complaint 
against the Spanish enterprise Barreiros Hermanos Internacional S.A., for 
a supposed violation of the ban on supplying weapons to South Africa. In 
January of 1983, the Council of Ministers denied a public enterprise 
called Bazán authorization to negotiate supplying weapons to this coun­
try whose value was 300 million dollars. In both cases, the Government's 
decisions were only justified by the necessity of fulfilling the agreed arms 
embargo imposed by Security Council Resolution 418 (1977) of 4 Novem­
ber 1977. This example clearly shows the existing monism in the integra­
tion of those acts into our domestic legal order, since the Security Council 
Resolution was not officially published in Spain and its content was nei­
ther reproduced nor developed by a domestic legal norm. 
Another interesting case took place by virtue of the UN Security 
Council resolutions regarding the Persian Gulf crisis. Resolutions 661 (6 
August 1990), 665 (25 August 1990) and 670 (25 September 1990) imposed 
an economic embargo on Iraq, ordering the suspension of all economic 
operations with Iraq, Kuwait or enterprises from these countries, freezing 
their economic assets abroad and ordering a total blockade by land, air or 
sea. None of these resolutions were published in Spain. In fact, before the 
adoption of the first one of them, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and 
Finances adopted an Order, dated 4 August 1990, establishing several 
restrictions on economic operations with Iraq, Kuwait and the enterprises 
of both countries. This Order was not confirmed by a legal norm after the 
adoption of the above mentioned resolutions by the Security Council. 
Later on, another Order of 6 August 1990, established new restrictions on 
economic operations with Iraq, Kuwait and their enterprises freezing the 
economic assets of both States in Spain. This order, in spite of its coinci­
dence with the first resolution, did not bear any reference to Resolution 
661 and did not reproduce its content either. That is to say, that it was 
automatically received in our domestic law with no necessity of publica­
tion. 
On the other hand, from Resolution 661 it was understood that it 
related to competences attributed by Spain to European Communities, 
fulfiling at a domestic level the economic sanctions imposed by the UNO 
through EEC Regulation 2340/90, of 8 August 1990 on trade prevention 
between the Community and Iraq and Kuwait and through Decision 90 / 
414/CECA. As we shall see later on, normative acts of European Com­
munities are not officially published in Spain and both normative texts 
were adopted saying explicitly that they were executing the commercial 
embargo on Iraq and Kuwait agreed by Security Council Resolution 661 
of 7 August 1990. Right afterwards, Spain adopted an order on 10 August 
1990, relating to the administrative authorization needed to export food 
products for humanitarian purposes. This new order did not refer at all to 
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Security Council Resolutions, and was complementary to EEC Regula­
tion 2340/1990. 
These examples demonstrate the automatic reception of binding nor­
mative acts of international organisations in our domestic legal order. In 
none of the mentioned cases were resolutions of the Security Council offi­
cially published in Spain. Only if needed did our Government adopt by 
itself or by the European Communities, domestic normative acts of exe­
cution. 
Nevertheless, it has been said that this official publication is not 
really needed since the OBS had previously published the constitutive 
treaties of the international organisation. But though Spain accepted the 
UN Charter on 14 December 1955, that Charter was officially published 
in the OBS on 16 November 1990, with an errata list published in the OBS 
of 28 November 1990. In short, the lack of publication of Security Council 
Resolutions could not be overcome by the Charter's publication since it 
was published after it. 
On the other hand, the second condition required by our State to con­
clude treaties, that is to say, Parliament's prior authorization according to 
arts. 93 and 94-1 SC, does not take place in practice for binding normative 
acts of international organisations either. 
2.2.2. Is there any requírement that law derived from international 
organisations should be published officially at a national level? 
As seen supra in 2.2.1., the acts of international organisations, according to 
an analogical interpretation of arts. 96-1 SC and 1-5 CC, must be officially 
published in the OBS in order to be directly applied to citizens by judicial 
or administrative bodies. 
2.2.3. What place in the domestic legal hierarchy is accorded to law 
derived from international organisations? 
Binding acts adopted by an international organisation form a sort of "de­
rived law" or "secondary norms" with regard to the organisation's consti­
tutive treaty, which gives them a normative value. Therefore, once those 
acts become part of our domestic law through their publication in the 
OBS, they acquire the same rank as that of the international treaty which 
constitutes their juridical base. That is to say, they have a higher rank than 
domestic norms and it is also possible to apply art. 96-1, last sentence, SC 
analogically regarding international treaties. In consequence, binding acts 
adopted by international organisations may be abolished, suspended or 
modified only by virtue of other acts also adopted by that organisation 
and never through domestic laws or other internal provisions. 
2.2.4. How does the judge give effect to law derived from interna­
tional organisations? 
The application by Spanish judges and courts of those acts of international 
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organisations forming part of our domestic law will have to observe the 
above mentioned rules when speaking of the judicial application of inter­
national conventional provisions. In short: official publication in the OBS 
in arder to be applied to citizens and acquire their supralegal rank. 
The judicial application of acts of international organisations is the 
same as the judicial application of treaties. There are no differences in this 
matter. 
A different question is the value granted by our case law to certain 
non-mandatory acts of international organisations on human rights. Art. 
10-2 se says:
"The norms relative to basic rights and liberties which are recognized by
the Constitution, shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and agree­
ments on those matters ratified by Spain".
This norm attributes to a non-binding resolution of the UN General
Assembly, by direct allusion, and international treaties on human rights 
binding for Spain an added value: they constitute interpretative criteria 
of the se, regardless of those treaties' binding character in our domestic 
law, by virtue of art. 96 SC. 
About art. 10-2 se, our eonstitutional eourt has adopted a broad 
interpretation granting this interpretative value of the eonstitution not 
only to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see Judgment 62/ 
1982, of 5 October), but also to other non-binding acts of international 
organisations related to human rights. For example, it stated in a judg­
ment of 23 November 1981 that: 
"The International Labour Organisation's recornmendations, differing 
from agreements and not directly mentioned in art. 10-2 SC, are orienta­
tive texts that, though not binding, may be qualified as interpretative cri­
teria of agreements". 
An interpretative value of the eonstitution has also been attributed 
to Resolution 11 (65) of the eouncil of Europe (Judgment 41/1982, of 2 
July), to Report 36 of the Trades Union Freedom eommittee of the 
Administrative eouncil of the International Labour Organisation (Judg­
ment 53/1982, of 22 July and 65/1982 of 10 November), etc. 
We must consider that though by means of art 10-2 se, non- binding 
normative acts on human rights coming from international organisations 
may assume the role of interpretative criteria, it does not mean that they 
also achieve mandatory force in our domestic law. As our eonstitutional 
eourt stated in judgment 36/1991, of 14 February: 
" ... we must nevertheless specify what international dispositions must 
we take into account in order to fulfil the content of art. 10-2 of our Cons­
titution, since not all the questions mentioned are treaties or international 
agreements ratified by Spain. That is the case of the United Nations Stan­
dard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, of 29 
November 1985, also called Beijing Rules( ... ) or the Recommendation of 
the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 17 September 1987 
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(R-87-20). Both cases express a generally accepted doctrine that must 
surely inspire the action of the public powers but that <loes not bind the 
legislator". 
2.3. European Communities Law 
2.3.1. Is EC law part of the domestic legal arder? If yes, how does it 
become part of domestic law? 
Ee derived Law is part of our domestic law and its reception is automati­
cally produced by means of the Spanish Act of Adherence to the European 
eommunities. 
Art. 93 se allows the attribution of competences derived from the 
eonstitution to the European eommunities, as occurs in almost all mem­
ber States' eonstitutions. 
The European eommunities' eonstitutive Treaties became part of 
our domestic law from the date established in the Adherence Treaty of 
Spain and Portugal: 1 January 1986, and this took place at the moment of 
their publication in the OBS. On 12 June 1985, the Treaty of Adherence 
was adopted and on 2 August Parliament authorized the adherence by 
Organic Law 10/1985, which was unanimously voted in both chambers. 
This organic law was the formal procedure which allowed the Spanish 
Government to deposit the adherence instruments to the European eoal 
and Steel eommunity and the ratification documents for the EEe and the 
EAEC. These international instruments, as well as those of the other 
eleven States (ten former member States and Portugal) produced the 
adherence of Spain to the European eommunities on 1 January 1986, and 
simultaneously the reception and entry into force for Spain of all its origi­
nal and derived law in force to that date. 
The approval of the eonstitutive Treaties implies the acceptance of 
the derived law that will be adopted from 1 January 1986 onwards with 
the mandatory and legal effect set out in the constitutive Treaties. 
2.3.2. Is there any requirement the law should be publíshed officially 
at the national level? 
Ee derived Law does not need an internal official publication - in the 
OBS - to be directly applied. 
Toe requirement for official publication of treaties set out in art. 96-1 
se, broadened by the doctrine to international organisations' normative 
acts, does not stand for Ee derived law for two different reasons. First of 
all, the publicity requirement of art. 96-1 se would not stand for the 
"acquis communautaire" because of the lex specialis nature of art. 93 SC. 
That is to say, the official publication requirement of art. 96-1 se would 
be among the constitutional competences attributed to the European 
eommunities. Second, because art. 96-1 se requires the official publica­
tion and not interna! publication in the OBS. In this sense, it is not con­
trary to art. 96-1 se that the eonstitutive Treaties establish that normative 
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acts of the European Institutions must not be published in Spanish and 
only in the European Communities' Official Journal (ECOJ hereinafter). 
By both ways the official publication in the ECOJ guarantees the publicity 
principie set out in art. 9-3 SC. 
Acts of Community Institutions that may not be directly applied -
those that require later measures of normative implementation and inter­
nal execution - do not require an internal official publication either. The 
OBS will not publish directives, recommendations or decisions, but inter­
nal norms that develop them. 
On the other hand, in order to insert into our domestic legal order the 
"acquis communautaire" prior to adherence, that had already been pub­
lished in the ECOJ in other languages, a special and official publication in 
Spanish was made in the ECOJ listing by topic all normative acts that 
were in force on 1 January 1986. Nevertheless the application of those acts 
will be gradual, according to the calendar established in the Adherence 
Act, till 31 December 1995. 
2.3.3. What place. in the domestic legal hierarchy is accorded to the 
different types aj EC law? 
EC derived law has a supralegal rank as a whole. 
The primacy of EC norms (constitutive Treaties and derived law) 
over national ones is not based on constitutional provisions relative to 
their reception and hierarchy in our domestic law, but on the special char­
acter of EC law as an autonomous law different from member States' 
domestic law, that is also above their jurisdictions (arts. 5 EECT, 86 
ECSCT and 192 EAECT); it is a consequence of the transfer of sovereignty 
to the EC Institutions through the act of adherence. 
Our Constitution does not say anything on the reception of intema­
tional organisations' acts - by extension also those of EC derived law -
or on their hierarchy. Applying the same analogical interpretation of the 
last sentence of art. 96 SC which allowed us to state the higher normative 
rank of the binding acts adopted by international organisations (see supra 
2.2.1. and 2.2.3.) to normative acts of EC Institutions, we can state that 
their abolition, suspension or modification may only be achieved by 
other acts of the same Institutions and never through domestic laws or 
other internal provisions. The higher status of EC derived law relative to 
domestic law is thus implicitly recognized, also at a constitutional level. 
2.3.4. Is the interpretation of EC law subject to special rules in the 
domestic court? 
Toe interpretation of EC derived law, as well as its application, must be 
done in accordance with the uniformity principle. There are no specific 
norms on it. 
Mention must be made of arts. 164 and 177 of the European Econ­
omic Community Treaty with regard to the competences of the Court of 
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Justice when interpreting the Treaty's provisions and the ads adopted by 
Community institutions. 
2.3.5. How does the judge give effect to EC law? 
It is the judicial body of each member Sta te that must guarantee the corred 
performance of EC law. This implies the strid observance of the suprem­
acy, dired effed, and uniform application principles that constitute the 
heart of such a law. 
Spanish judges and courts must therefore not only know the laws 
(original and derived) but also ECCJ's case law when interpreting and 
applying EC norms. 
On the other hand, the control of EC law application by Spanish 
judges and courts is closely related to a special judicial proceeding called 
"interlocutory question" (art. 177 of the European Economic Community 
Treaty and art. 150 of the European Atomic Energy Treaty) whose aim is 
to get the necessary knowledge for the corred application of EC norms 
and to find out if the national norm is compatible with them. In case of 
doubts over the treaties' interpretation and the validity and interpreta­
tion of ads of the institutions of the Communities, the national court or 
tribunal may request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon if it con­
siders that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a 
court or tribunal, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the 
Court of Justice. 
In short, Spanish judges and courts must apply EC law taking into 
account the basic principles already mentioned and ECCJ's case law, 
requesting the interlocutory question when needed. 
A quick analysis of Spanish judicial practice immediately after our 
adherence to the European Communities shows how fast our judges are 
incorporating EC law, through the interlocutory question of art. 177 
EECT, as well as by the comprehension of the specific notes of EC law. 
With regard to interlocutory questions, we observe that none of them 
has been asked on "the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established 
by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide" ( art. 177-1 e 
EECT). Nevertheless, questions have been often raised about the other 
paragraphs of the same article. Among these requests for interpretation 
of the EEC Treaty (art. 177-1 a EECT) we may mention the one dated 21 
March 1986 of the Central Labour Court (ECCJ Judgment of 29 Septem­
ber 1987, case 126/86); another dated 15 June 1988 of the TerritorialAudi­
ence of Valencia (ECCJ Judgment of 11 July 1989, case 170/88); another 
dated 7 November 1989 of the Higher Court of Justice of Catalonia (ECCJ 
Judgment of 25 July 1991, cases C-1/90 and C-176/90); etc. On the other 
hand, with regard to the "validity and interpretation of ads of the institu­
tions of the Community" (art. 177-1 b EECT) we may mention one judg­
ment of 13 March 1989 of the court of First Instance of Oviedo (ECCJ 
Judgment of 13 November 1990, case C-106/89); another of 11 June 1990 
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of the Higher Court of Justice of Andalusia (ECCJ Judgment of 25 July 
1991, case C-202/90); two of 11 and 12 September 1990 of the Penal Court 
of Alicante; etc. We may also mention the one about the interpretation of 
the EEC Treaty as well as d�rived law of 1 December 1990 of the Higher 
Court of Justice of Cantabria (case C-369/90, not yet published). 
Therefore, as we have already seen, those interlocutory questions 
have been raised by judicial Spanish organs in cases "pending before a 
court or tribunal( ... ) against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law" according to art. 177-3 EEC (for example, the above 
mentioned cases of 21 March 1986 of the Central Labour Court or of 7 
November 1989 of the Higher Court of Justice of Catalonia, etc.) or, under 
art. 177-2 EECT, whenever there are such remedies. Toe Resolution of the 
Economic and Administrative Central Court of 29 March 1990 deter­
mined that: 
11 
... the Economic and Administrative Courts constitute, according to art. 
177 of the Treaty of Rome, 'jurisdictional courts' and are competent, in 
consequence, to raise the above mentioned interlocutory appeal". 
We may also note that at least in three cases (Supreme Court Judg­
ments of 14 May 1987 and of 10 October 1989) where the final decision 
did not admit another judicial remedy according to art. 177-3 EEC, Span­
ish courts did not accept the interlocutory questions raised. Nevertheless, 
in all cases a corred application of ECCJ Judgment 283/81 of 6 October 
1982, Sté C.I.L.F.I.T./Minístere de la Santé (Rec. 1982, 3431-3432) was made, 
where the ECCJ decided that a national court of last instance is not 
obliged to raise an interlocutory question when: 
"the correct application of EC law is so clear that it abolishes all reasona­
ble doubt; the existence of such a case must be determined according to 
the specific notes of EC law, the peculiar difficulties that its interpretation 
brings up and the risk of differences in case law inside the Community". 
On the other hand, in relation to the character of the European norms 
that become integrated into our domestic legal order ( direct effect, 
supremacy), we acknowledge a correct application of them by Spanish 
judges and courts in general. It is true that there were mistakes at the 
beginning: for exemple when the Court of Chiva judgment of 18 Decem­
ber 1987 recognized a direct effect to art. 2-1 of the Council's Directive 
87 /344/CEE of 22 June on Legal Defence Assurance though its expiry 
date did not come till 1 January 1990, or when the Supreme Court Judg­
ment of 21 December 1988 that did not recognize a direct effect to arts. 9-
1 and 12 of the EEC Treaty, forgetting that art. 12 was the first norm of the 
Community whose direct effect was explicitly recognized by the ECCJ in 
the well known Van Gend en L oas case of 5 February 1963. It went even 
further in denying EC law's primacy when it stated that: 
"Spain's adherence ( ... ) does not mean( ... ) a tacit annulment of domestic 
legislation in force". 
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But apart from these isolated cases, Spanish judicial organs have 
made a corred application of EC law. Thus, a Supreme Court Judgment 
of 28 April 1987 attributed correctly to EC law: 
11 ... direct effect and prevailing 'character by virtue of the partial transfer 
of sovereignty that the adherence of Spain to the Community, authorized 
by Organic Law 10 /1985, of 2 August, implies according to art. 93 of our 
Constitution". 
Concerning the direct effect of EC norms and concretely of primary 
law of the European Communities, we may allude to a Judgment of the 
Territorial Audience of Barcelona, of 16 December 1986, that attributed 
direct applicability to arts. 7, 52 and 60 of the EEC Treaty. Toe direct effect 
of Regulations has been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court. It 
stated in a Judgment of 17 April 1989: 
"By their nature and function, Regulations do produce immediate effects 
(ECCJ Judgment of 14 December 1971) simultaneously and uniformly for 
all member States". 
A judgment of 24 April 1990 of the same Court stated that such 
effects, in cases of Regulations that require a domestic normative imple­
mentation, begin from the Regulations' enforcement and not from the 
adoption of a domestic norm of execution. Toe direct effect doctrine has 
been correctly applied in Spanish case law. Another judgment of the 
Higher Court of Justice of La Rioja of 27 February 1990 applied a Direc­
tive's disposition - that was not inserted in our domestic law order yet 
though its execution deadline had already run out - against what was 
established in the Workers' Statute. 
EC law's primacy over domestic law was clearly stated by a Supreme 
Court Judgment of 24 April 1990 which said: 
" ... prior (domestic) norms contrary to EC law will be annulled and later 
ones also contrary will not be in accordance with the Constitution - arts. 
93 and 96-1 SC, but the ordinary judge is not obliged to raise the question 
of lack of conformity with the Constitution (art. 163 SC) in order to stop 
the application of the domestic norm, because it is entailed by the Court 
of Justice's case law that has established the principle pro comunitate". 
Furthermore, primary EC law's primacy has also been stated by 
Spanish case law by virtue of its conventional character. This way, a Reso­
lution of the Economic and Administrative Central Court of 5 April 1990 
stated that: 
"The Spanish Treaty of Adherence to the European Communities, like 
any other treaty, becomes part of our domestic legal order from its publi­
cation and its dispositions will only be modified, suspended or annulled 
according to the treaties themselves; therefore, it is evident that this norm 
is in force and it is applicable in Spain from 1 January 1986, abolishing 
explicitly all national dispositions, regardless of their rank, previous to 
the treaty's publication". 
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The Regulations' primacy has been stated in several occasions by 
Spanish case law (for example, Supreme Court Judgment of 17 April 
1989). 
Our Constitutional Court, in Judgment 28/1991 of 14 February, 
alluded to the possible contradiction between an EC norm and a later 
domestic law, confirming Spanish judges and courts' capacity not to 
apply legal dispositions contrary to EC law. In this judgment, as well as 
in Judgment 64/1991 of 22 March, the Constitutional Court affirmed its 
lack of competence to control the adjustment of the activity of Spanish 
Public Powers to EC law, considering also that such a control belongs to 
ordinary judges and courts as well as to the ECCJ. But, whenever national 
acts of application of an EC norm are not in accordance with fundamental 
rights and freedoms regulated in our Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court comes close to th.e decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court Solange I (1974) stating that fundamental rights are an essential part 
of the Bonn Fundamental Law. In the above mentioned Judgment 64/ 
1991, the Constitutional Court said that: 
"In short, it is a competence of this Court to recognise the impeachment 
of a public power's act made in execution of EC law on grounds of con­
tradiction with human rights, no matter what may be its rank according 
to art. 10-2 of the Constitution. 
In this case it is not a competence of this Court to decide whether the 
public powers' impugned activity is in accordance with EC law. The only 
problem we have to decide upon is whether the domestic norm and the 
applied acts of execution do respect the equality and non-discrimination 
principles of art. 14 of the Constitution". 
3. UNWRITTEN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES) 
3.1. Do international custom and the general principles of international 
law form part of the domestic legal arder? 
Our domestic law - whether the current Spanish Constitution or the 
norms of lower rank - does not explicitly regulate the integration or re­
ception of international customary norms (international customs). Our 
constitutional history shows that only the Republican Constitution of 1931 
expressly mentioned the integration of international custom into our do­
mestic law stating in art. 7 that "the State of Spain will observe the univer­
sal norms of international law, integrating them into our domestic law". 
In any event, the absence of a specific constitutional provision on the 
integration of international general law does not mean the exclusion of its 
reception. In this sense, when art. 96-1 SC says that the provisions of 
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international treaties validly concluded "may only be abolished, modi­
fied or suspended[ ... ] in accord with general norms of international law" 
it is implicitly recognizing that international customs prevail over domes­
tic laws in case of termination, modification or suspension of treaties.  It 
may be analogically stated that this solution stands for all cases, which 
means that international customs do have a supralegal rank in Spanish 
Law. 
Another case of automatic legal integration of unwritten interna­
tional law is set out in art. 21-2 of the Judicial Power Organic Law that 
establishes in our law the jurisdictional immunities that derive from 
norms of public international law. 
Therefore, although the Spanish Constitution does not mention inter­
national custom, it may be included in the constitutional framework by 
means of the reference of art. 96-1 to the "general norms of international 
law". 
On the other hand, general principies of law constitute a normative 
regulation of both domestic and international law. They are first formu­
lated in domestic law and applied afterwards at international level when 
similar problems arise. They appear in art. 38-1 of the Statute of the Inter­
national Court of Justice (ICJ hereinafter) under the reference to "general 
principies of law recognized by civilized nations". 
General principies of international law - also called structural prin­
cipies - are included in domestic legal orders since they inspire the inter­
national norms of customary or conventional character that are later on 
received by national laws. 
In conclusion, international custom as well as general principles of 
law are inserted into our domestic legal order. 
3.2. What is the general attitude of judges towards unwritten interna­
tional law? 
In spite of the constitutional silence on the application of international cus­
toms in our domestic law, Spanish judges and courts have applied them 
without requiring a special act of reception (see Judgments of the Supreme 
Court of 16 December 1927 and 19 June 1967). It is clear, therefore, that for 
Spanish judicial organs such norms forro part of domestic law. Another 
question is the difficulties that Spanish courts find in applying them be­
cause of their unwritten character. In this sense, we may recall a Supreme 
Court judgment of 5 January 1965, in which the Court denied immunity 
from penal jurisdiction to the wife of a member of a diploma tic mission of 
the United States in Spain denying that such an immunity from jurisdic­
tion was an international custom, with the explicit indication that "it is 
based on simple opinions of authors of International Law". 
After the Spanish Constitution of 1978 we can state regarding the ref­
erence of art. 96-1 to the "general norms of international law" that inter­
national custom is integrated into our domestic law from its formation 
and may be therefore applied by judges and courts. Such an integration is 
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not only imposed by case law, but also by the coherence principle of the 
State's activity, since when the Spanish State is internationally bound by 
custom, the same binding should affect it at a national level; the opposite 
would be to admit the State's responsibility for nonobservance of interna­
tional obligations. 
3.3. In practice what place do international custom and general princi­
pies of international law have in judicial decisions? 
According to Spanish case law, even before the Constitution of 1978, inter­
national custom is integrated into our domestic law from its formation 
and may thereafter be applied by national judges and courts. Por this rea­
son it is their duty to determine the existence of any international practice, 
binding for the State, that becomes a custom. In conclusion, judicial deci­
sions may be based on international custom. 
As far as general principles of law are concerned, they are inserted 
into our domestic legal order and though they cannot be properly 
invoked as "applicable law" they do contribute to the application of 
international custom. 
A recent example of Spanish case law is found in Constitutional 
Court Judgment 36/1991 of 14 February. Questioned about international 
treaties on human rights ratified by Spain, which according to art. 10-2 SC 
had to be taken into account in the interpretation of minors' constitu­
tional right to an effective judicial defense, the Court said: 
"Dispositions that have to be taken into account are contained in the 
lnternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in the Rome 
Convention, as well as, authorized by the iura novit curia principle, those 
contained in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 
20 November 1989, that was ratified on 31 December 1990". 
3.4. Are the criteria of international law adopted by domestic law to iden­
tifiJ international custom ar general principies of international law? 
If not, how does domestic law identifiJ international custom ar gen­
eral principies? 
Toe reception or integration of international custom and general princi­
ples of international law into our domestic legal order is made following 
the international formulation. 
Therefore Spanish judicial bodies must follow international rules 
when they try to identify international or general principles. 
The task of national judges and courts to determine the existence of 
an international practice, binding for the Spanish state, must also be done 
in accordance with international law. 
Regarding general principles of international law, we must take into 
account that, since they are principles inserted into several national legal 
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orders, they will also form part of the Spanish one, as we have already 
seen in the above mentioned example (supra 3.3.). 
3.5. Once identified, do international custom ar general principies auto­
matically become part of domestic law? If not, what is the procedure 
by which international custom ar general principies are made part of 
domes tic law? 
Summing up from 3.1. to 3.4. we can state that: 
1) the integration of international custom into our domestic law is
automatically made, with no need for an express act of reception;
2) the integration has a general scope of application with regard to
the whole international general law, be it existing norms when
enforcing the Constitution or new customs formed later on;
3) international custom is integrated from its formation in interna­
tional law.
4. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SITUATIONS
4.1. Are there any preliminartJ questions (recognition of States, parties to 
treaty, membership of international organisations, state of war, etc.) 
which the national judge must ar may refer to the executive? If so, is 
the judge free to disregard the executive's advice? 
This question is closely linked to the interpretation of international norms 
by national judicial bodies for their later application. 
It is clear that Spanish judicial bodies - to whom art. 117-3 SC 
attributes the exclusive exercise of the jurisdictional power - can neither 
take the place of the Executive Power (Government) in foreign policy 
direction nor get for themselves specific competences from it in the field 
of intemational relations. 
Anyway it is necessary to say that Spanish judges and courts have 
the absolute power to interpret and apply intemational norms in our 
domestic law with no other limits than the observance of the interpreta­
tion rules of arts. 31-33 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of 
Treaties, ratified by Spain. 
Our law does not regulate a possible participation of the Executive 
Power, whose interpretation would be imposed on the Judicial Power. As 
seen supra in 1.5.14. Spanish judges and courts - as case law shows -
have for a long time considered themselves competent to interpret inter­
national norms with no need to refer to the Executive Power, which does 
not prevent them from using the legal mechanism of the "inquiries for 
better providing" to request from the Foreign Affairs Ministry documents 
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or reports of any outstanding preliminary questionning in order to adopt 
a certain decision. 
In any case it is important to make clear that: 
a) the request to the Foreign Affairs Ministry through the mechanism
of "inquiries for better providing" is optional for the judicial bodies;
b) the opinion of that institution <loes not bind them though it is
usual to follow it.
Finally, when interpretation and later application of international 
norms in our domestic law is made by administrative - and not judicial 
- bodies, Spanish law requires the consultation of the eouncil of State in
plenary session (art. 21-3 and 4 of the Organic law on the eouncil of
State) (see supra 1.5.14.). lts legal opinion <loes not bind the Administra­
tion, but it is usually followed. 
5. FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW
5.1. When giving effect to international law does the domestic court take 
account of foreign or international case law? 
International case law is more and more taken into account by Spanish ju­
dicial bodies as the "authentic" interpretation whenever it comes from In­
ternational eourts whose binding jurisdiction is recognized by Spain 
(International eourt of Justice, European eourt of Human Rights and 
eourt of Justice of the European eommunities). 
In this sense and within the framework of the European eonvention 
on Human Rights, our national bodies have frequently invoked the juris­
prudence of the European eourt of Human Rights (hereinafter EeHR) to 
determine the scope and real contents of such rights according to art. 10-2 
se which says that norms regarding fundamental rights must be inter­
preted in accordance with international treaties and agreements ratified 
by Spain. A kind of automatic binding status is thus recognized to EeHR 
case law, to which the States have on the other hand attributed the eon­
vention's interpretation and application by virtue of art. 45. 
In this way the eonstitutional eourt's broader interpretation of art. 
10-2 se is also confirmed, since whenever an international agreement on
human rights admits the existence of a jurisdictional organ of control, the
interpretation of the eonstitution has to be made taking into account
international case law brought up in application of that specific con-ven­
tional text. That is the case of the European eonvention on Human rights
as well as EeHR case law. A eonstitutional eourt Judgment, of 14 July
1981, said:
"It is in the sense of art. 6-1 of the European Convention for the Protec­
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that 'everyone is enti­
tled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independant and impartial tribunal...' This reasonable period was inter-
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preted by the European Court of Human Rights first of all for penal pro­
ceedings (Neumeister and Ringeisen cases) and later on for the proceedings 
of administrative jurisdictions (Konig case), in the sense that the reasona­
ble period of a proceeding must be assessed according to the circurnstan­
ces of each case and taking into account 'that case's difficulties, the 
applicant's own conduct and the manner in which that case has been 
handled by the administrative and judicial authorities' (ECHR, Konig 
case, Judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A, Nº 27, p. 34). 
( ... ) Art. 10-2 of the Constitution establishes that' norms regarding funda­
mental rights and freedoms recognized by the Constitution must be 
interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and international treaties and agreements on those subjects rati­
fied by Spain. This article allows us to use Konig's case law to determine 
whether the requirements of the case submitted to this constitutional 
jurisdiction are fulfilled in arder to qualify as constitutionally harmful the 
activity of the organ of the judicial power". 
Toe same could be said of the ECCJ case law, holder of interpretative 
competence for EC law. It is true that Spanish judicial organs have shown 
great receptivity regarding ECCJ case law in the application of funda­
mental principles of EC law (direct effect, supremacy) or in the interpre­
tation of substantive law. In several judgments our Constitutional Court 
referred to ECCJ case law, using interpretative criteria of EC law to 
resolve questions put to it. We partially reproduced in 2.3.5. a Supreme 
Court Judgment of 24 April 1990 where it was stated that Spanish judges 
"are bound by ECCJ case law". 
5.2. How are the decisions of international courts (the ICJ, ECJ, ECHR, 
etc.) given effect in the domestic legal arder? 
First of all we have to say that the "exequatur" is an appropriate mecha­
nism to execute foreign judgments, but not international ones. 
The importance of this execution in our domestic law lies in the 
Spanish admission of the binding jurisdiction of the ICt - according to 
art. 36-2 of its Statute -, of the ECHR - according to art. 46-1 of the 
Rome Convention - and of the ECCJ - according to the Act of adher­
ence. 
According to arts. 59 and 60 of the ICJ Statute the Court's decisions 
have binding force between the parties and are final and without appeal. 
On the other hand, arts. 52 and 53 of the Rome Convention state that 
judgments of the ECHR shall be final and that the States undertake to 
abide by the decisions of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 
Finally, art. 187 of the European Economic Community Treaty and 
art. 159 of the European Atomic Energy Treaty state that ECCJ's judg­
ments shall be enforceable. 
In conclusion, we can generally affirm that judgments passed by 
international courts whose binding jurisdiction has been admitted by the 
Spanish State do have a final character and material force of law in our 
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domestic legal order. Such judicial decisions therefore bind the Spanish 
State. All its organs, which must recognize as valid and "authentic" the 
interpretation of international regulations made by them, have to give 
effect to those judgments with no other control than that relative to their 
authenticity. 
Execution must be according to the terms of the judgment otherwise 
the State will fall into international responsibility. But it is also true that 
States have great freedom in the adoption of the means necessary to exe­
cute international judgments except when the ECHR decides to allow a 
financia! compensation to the injured party (art. 50 of the Rome Conven­
tion of 4 November 1950). 
In any case, if such a compensation is not explicitly allowed, interna­
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